by Pooran Pandey | Aug 11, 2020 | Guests
India was recently elected to the Security Council for the two-year period, 2021-22. What does this portend for the UN – and for India?
As a serious player within the UN system and also as an active participant in UN peace keeping activities, a respected voice in G-77, a member of G-20, and representing 1/6th of humanity, India should push for the vital issues of governance, transparency, democracy and peace and protection of international law.
But much will depend on how the multilateral system itself evolves over the next few years.
The world order – post -Covid
COVID-19 has shaken the global order. All countries have lost a chunk of their economies, facing deep economic recession, high unemployment, and human fatalities.
The 73rd World Health Assembly decided in May to conduct an independent enquiry into the origin of the pandemic and its handling. The report will go to WHO’s Executive Council, chaired next year by India. The pandemic has created an unprecedented situation.
The multilateral system has also witnessed a sharpened US-China geo-strategic rivalry, creating new fault lines. This will demand fresh perspectives on our future multilateralism.
Developing a new international compact
This 8th term of India in the Security Council, unlike in the past, will potentially present it with a number of challenges and opportunities. India has already made its intent amply clear, by stating that it seeks to address the following:
- challenge to the internal governance of the UN system;
- an effective global response to international terrorism; and
- multilateralism based on the rule of law, sovereignty, democracy, and peaceful coexistence.
India has long been pursuing these goals but the timing of a directed push could not have been better. India’s role in advancing outstanding issues can be substantive as it is also known among its peers as a nation with a voice of reason and a firm supporter of multilateral institutions.
India over the period is expected to adopt a “5-S” approach during its Security Council membership for the next two years. This approach is intended at leveraging India’s civilizational strength and ethos embodying elements of Samman (respect), Samvad (dialogue), Sahayog (cooperation), Shanti (peace), and Samriddhi (prosperity). Through this composite approach, India would also like to advocate for a “new orientation for a reformed multilateral system,” (NORMS).
India believes that a genuine multilateralism is needed to reflect contemporary realities, including issues of climate, terrorism, peace and security and technology, guided by dialogue, mutual respect and commitment to international law.
With its global values and positive contribution to ‘the security of the global commons’, India will work constructively with partners to overcome old and new ‘fault lines’ that exist in international systems, sometimes dictated by the veto power. India’s role as an ancient civilization power and its long standing credence in the UN system will further help bring to the world its well articulated ethos of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” – the whole world is one family.
India’s growing global influence
India’s overwhelming election to the Security Council coincides with its 75th anniversary of independence and its G-20 presidency in 2022. The period is also likely to witness an expansion of the G-7, with India likely to join.
Other key developments during the period can likely include firming up of Quad (India, Japan, Australia and USA) – a strategic alliance- falling into place, India’s chairmanship in the executive council of the WHO, a likely preferential trade regime and deepened economic and military partnership with the US.
Alongside these developments would be a variety of India-led efforts:
- promote a free and open Indo-Pacific while strengthening its presence within Asian Development Bank (ADB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), BRICS Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment (AIIB);
- develop a strategic cooperation with EU (2025);
- deepen the relationship with Middle East and African region through International Solar Alliance (ISA), a treaty based inter-governmental alliance on renewable and clean energy covering MENA, Pacific, Asia and Africa.
- Pursue civil nuclear cooperation with the EU after a long and protracted negotiations and growing trade and commercial partnership and potential entry of India into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
These developments, in various ways, offer a unique opportunity to India to ramp up its diplomatic outreach leverage on the Security Council seat.
India’s push for an assertive foreign policy
In a fast changing geo-strategic realm, India has steadily been moving away from the traditional notion of non-alignment, which it spearheaded in the 1960s. The aim, back then, was to retain its own standing without siding with any particular political bloc or ally during the Cold War.
That ‘era of great caution’ in India’s foreign policy, however, may be weaning away from India’s developing long term strategic plan. India may now step out more decisively, become more confident.
The Security Council is perhaps the most important multilateral decision-making mechanism, but is increasingly polarised. To push an agenda of shared international partnership, India should adopt value-based positions, aspiring for the leadership of the non-permanent members and be the voice of the smaller nations.
Opportunities facing India
For decades, India has been at the forefront of driving efforts to reform the Security Council, underling that it deserves its rightful place as a permanent member of the Security Council.
There is already a G-4 proposal on the table, in which India, along with Germany, Japan and Brazil, has been pressing their case for reform and expansion of the Security Council, albeit without veto initially. India has consistently advocated for inclusion of African members, based on the regional consensus, towards a reform process that is central to redrawing an inclusive and an equitable international system.
These are challenging proposals. Informal discussion within the UN has thus far been far from satisfactory, due to vested interests and regional politics.
There are some caveats, given the nature of changing international relations and national aspirations, veering away from regional focus, that India will have to work diligently within the confines of existing realities. Issues like a global convention on terrorism, climate change, digital privacy, connectivity issues and maritime laws, all of these close to India’s heart.
Leveraging the Council seat for ‘global good’
India can potentially leverage its presence in the Security Council in pushing for its own deserving and qualified candidates to head UN organizations, its system and endeavour to get elected to more UN bodies, committees, as well as positions within the system to be able to play a constructive and comprehensive role in helping to crystallize issues of common concern.
India can also leverage mechanisms available within the realm of the non-permanent membership through the power of ‘collective veto’ with 7 of its cohort for any P-5 to pass through the muster for adoption. Non-permanent members also assume rotational presidency on a monthly basis, an opportunity to put a global initiative before the Council.
Ahead of the vote, India had launched a campaign brochure, which highlighted:
- the need for transparency in UN peace-keeping mandates;
- a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism;
- joint efforts for UN reform and expansion of the UNSC.
These issues are not new, but their context and circumstances have changed over time, raising hopes of new solutions in the near future.
Achieving this, to a large extent, would depend on how India would conduct diplomacy in the global body, build alliances based on principles of trust and raise issues that go beyond the obvious interests of the P-5.
Looking ahead
As the world’s largest democracy, India’s longstanding contributions, recognition as a nation with reason and its record in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions including during Covid-19, the time is right for a full-view demonstration of its intent and action in helping to reshape the international order, along inclusive and enduring lines.
To make such a comprehensive contribution, however, India will need to shed its historical hesitation, redraw its strategic geo-political-economic options, build democratic alliances and weigh in on substantive issues such as the rules for connectivity, maritime security, terrorism, climate change and a rules-based digital world.
by Joanna Tao | Jun 29, 2020 | Board
The Australian bushfires and the Indian floods, both of 2019, are just a glimpse into some disproportionate consequences of the global climate crisis that is upon us.
Current international law systems have proven to be limited as a tool for securing justice to those marginalised by the international order.
Trusteeship as a model of governance
Fellow Board member, Prof Klaus Bosselmann, regarded as a world authority on the subject, has observed that the concept of Earth trusteeship concerns “the legal obligation of States to act as trustees to manage ecological systems for the benefit of nature and humanity”.
Earth trusteeship, he says, transform our understanding of state sovereignty. “At present States do not have any legal obligations towards the global environment beyond those they accept/or reject by their own consent, determined by national self-interest.” In fact, States should be regarded formally as ‘trustees of the Earth’, with ‘fundamental fiduciary obligations’ that they cannot deny or trade-off against self-interest.
It is my view that the concept has potential application to one of the planet’s major ‘shared rivers’.
The Mekong river system provides a platform to discover the potential of trusteeship governance. It is a potential model – a tool to bring an otherwise non-cohesive group of states into cooperation before more serious consequences of the climate crisis becomes manifest.
The differing political, socio-economic and environmental threats posed by global trade from a trans-boundary river that flows through six developing countries requires sustainable management of resources and development that is underpinned by a framework of shared values.
The concept of shared resource management is at the core of trusteeship governance. We in the Global Studies Centre are committed to researching three potential trusteeship governance models for the Mekong river system.
The public trust doctrine is the principle that a sovereign state (or a delegated authority) holds certain natural resources in trust for the public which is the beneficiary, regardless of private property rights. The trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary, and can be held accountable through judicial protection if in breach of duty.
The concepts of common heritage of mankind and the public trust doctrine dominate the legal discourse on trusteeship governance for environmental priorities.
Whanganui River
Although widely recognized as necessary, it was 21 years later in New Zealand that the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill would be the first legislation to grant a river legal ‘personhood’ with all the corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person. India’s High Court would soon follow, granting the same rights to the Ganges and its tributary Yamuna. This was a critical step forward in environmental governance after three decades of regulation that failed to clean up the river.
Mekong River
The model will be studied as a potential solution for the Mekong, alongside the potential of applying the principles of the Tonle Sap UNESCO biosphere reserve to the rest of the Mekong, and finally the compatibility of the MA and the UNWC together.
The Mekong’s trans-boundary river system originates in the Tibetan Plateau, runs through China’s Yunnan Province, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and drains into the South China Sea through Vietnam.
A multilateral non-binding agreement between Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam (collectively referred to as the Lower Mekong Basin, LMB states) of which China and Myanmar are dialogue partners – the Mekong Agreement (MA) 1995 – currently governs the affairs of the system.
The MA purports to coordinate the activities of the Mekong countries for the sustainable development, management and utilization of the river’s water resources. Its objectives are overseen by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) which has wide-ranging duties assigned by the MA leaving much scope for the development of protocols by the MRC and its bodies.
The UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNWC) 2014 which encapsulates customary international law on the use of rivers, forms, along with the MA, the complete legal regime of the river system.
The UNWC codifies the equitable values of “utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable use thereof for present and future generations”, while taking into account the special needs of developing countries.
As it is intended to be a flexible framework within which management can be delivered within the context of the relevant basin, the UNWC can be used to strengthen the MA by holding signatories accountable to the norms of customary international law.
This is critical for the future of the Mekong, as the MA does not detail certain procedures of international water law and, although it is grounded in the principle of sustainable development, it is ambiguous, discretionary and, more importantly, non-binding.
Growing competition over water resources, dissonance in political and economic realities of the Mekong countries, and the need for greater international cooperation, all create a window of opportunity for environmental governance. We may be able to use the UNWC and the MA as a legal backdrop.
Stakeholders from public organizations have placed their focus on the unsustainability of hydropower dams, stressing the loss of productivity, vital sediments, nutrients and geo-morphology of the river. The reduction in water quality of the wetlands means disruption of the land and aquatic ecosystem. The resulting change in the characteristics of the river has increased poverty and has prompted an exodus from the area.
A research challenge
For the future of research, this means that an intersectional analysis of the environmental and economic impacts of dam construction, of poverty and of political strategy is crucial.
These analyses and case studies from New Zealand itself and the Danube River System in Europe may help pave a model for the sustainable trusteeship governance of the Mekong river.
The Centre will continue to work on this model in the years to come.
by Abbas Nazari | Jun 21, 2020 | Young Global Scholars Group
The weak-kneed efforts at strengthening global security in recent decades are desperately in need of a reset.
Nowhere is this more palpably obvious than in Afghanistan, along of course with Syria, Yemen and Libya. But let me focus on Afghanistan, which is my country of origin.
Shortcomings of the latest peace deal
When the Taliban peace agreement was signed in February 2020, it was met with skepticism the world over, not least and most importantly from the Afghan people themselves. But the recent bombing of a maternity ward at a Kabul hospital shows just how much work there is left to do.
The US, as leading ‘peacemaker’ for Afghanistan, must not let the country fall into the quagmire of another civil war. Two decades after the ‘war on terror’ was first launched, the US must now take steps to ensure that the next twenty years are more fruitful than the last.
There have, in fact, been significant social and cultural gains throughout the country – in education, civil liberties, media freedoms, and in health. But in spite of this progress, both the Taliban and the Government led by President Ghani have failed to make significant progress in their dialogue.
This is largely due to the Taliban demand for the release of 5,000 prisoners, a point that was not agreed to by the Ghani administration before the signing of the deal. Progress is hampered by an ongoing impasse between the President and his former Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, who claims that the 2019 elections were fraudulent and who wants a larger role in the peace talks, even though he hasn’t outlined what this would be.
Even more troubling is the continued presence of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), an ISIS affiliate that exercises control over some areas in the provincial south.
A genuine national conference
In order to jump-start the lagging intra-Afghan talks, one solution might be to convene an international conference that brings together all of the factions at one table, including Ghani, Abdullah and the Taliban leadership, as well as civil society and minority groups.
This would be similar to the original Bonn agreement of 2001, but with Afghans themselves leading the discussions. One of the key concerns regarding the Taliban talks is that large sectors of Afghan society feel they are not being represented in such pivotal conversations.
This is partly due to the Ghani-Abdullah impasse, but it is also largely due to the secretive nature of the talks. Afghans wish to put any agreement to a nation-wide referendum. A nationwide conference will be an effective mid-point to allay these concerns. This may be met with skepticism at home, but it would highlight US commitment to the struggle.
The conference would need to be held in Afghanistan, and be largely led by the people of Afghanistan. The US could signal its support by facilitating the conference and offering logistical support but otherwise remaining in the background. This requires a delicate balancing act for the Department of State but with adequate appointments in place, it is not impossible.
Potential of multilateral engagement
Also key to Afghan stability is the role of India and Pakistan. Both countries have strong vested interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan does not wish to be sandwiched between India and a pro-New Delhi government in Kabul. Similarly, India sees the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands as a national security threat from where outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Taibah continue to operate.
Both countries are also intertwined in water wars, with India pledging support for the construction and refurbishment of hydroelectric dams in Afghanistan – a project which Pakistan sees as national security concern given the downstream impacts on the sensitive agricultural sector. Bringing these countries to the table will be a bigger challenge, but Afghanistan must signal to New Delhi and Islamabad that they are crucial to regional security.
As well as inviting a delegation to the aforementioned conference, it would be wise to establish a quadrilateral forum involving Kabul, New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington aimed at resolving disputes. This could begin with a resolution to fix the water wars, or to coordinate any other cross-border issues, such as migration and refugee flows.
A question of political will – at a difficult time
The situation in Afghanistan demands a continued engagement from successive American administrations. Although there is no possibility of American military involvement, the US would be wise to pursue other avenues of engagement, as outlined above.
Two decades after the war on terror was first launched, the US should take the steps now to ensure the next twenty years are more fruitful than the last.
The art of strengthening global peace and security is elusive, and in current times seems to be beyond the reach of the major powers.
Time for regional and sub-regional leading countries to contribute, however, complex this becomes.
by Claire Waghorn | Jun 19, 2020 | Board
Aviation is a force for good. It broadens the mind. It connects people with new cultures, experiences, places and opportunities; and it underpins the global economy.
Yet, its dependency on fossil fuel is harmful. What, then, to do?
Aviation currently contributes around 3% of global carbon emissions and, over the past decade, was the fastest-rising source of emissions.[1]
The impact of COVID-19 on the aviation industry is potentially shading some of the measures that should, in any event, be considered for a sustainable recovery. Yet concern is mounting over the business cost, and devastating environmental impact, of losing sight of effective action towards climate change.
Restarting aviation will play a key role in the recovery of the global economy. More broadly, climate change remains the greatest long-term challenge we face.
The convergence of these crises – the pandemic alongside climate instability – offers an unprecedented opportunity to ‘build back better’. Decisions taken now over the direction of, and investment in, the industry will ultimately impact the resilience of the sector, and thus aviation’s future viability.[2]
Pre-COVID shift
Even before the pandemic, the airline industry was facing increased public pressure with ‘the Greta effect’ of flygskam (flight shame), as well as the school strike-movement, and direct action by the Extinction Rebellion group.
This was not confined to the growing sphere of social awareness. Corporate environmental responsibility was also gently testing the waters: sustainability policies, carbon audits, carbon-accreditation schemes, and declining number of business flights, were all obvious targets for emission savings.
The joined-up issue of aviation and climate has made its way through to the UK Court of Appeal (27 Feb. ’20) which upheld the High Court’s decision to block the expansion of Heathrow Airport. The judicial decision, of course, was on a point of law: whether the designation of the ‘Airports National Policy Statement’ (new runway capacity and infrastructure at airports) was unlawful by reason of a failure to take into account the Government’s commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate change.
The Paris Agreement ought to have been taken into account by the Secretary of State in the preparation of the ANPS. An explanation was given as to how it was taken into account, but in effect it was judged not, and so the runway expansion application was denied.[3] The case awakened judicial conversation on how to address climate responsibility.
COVID shift
The impact of COVID-19 may be to further highlight the tension between current aviation fossil-dependency and the global climate crisis.
For one, there may be a generational shift in which consumers are prioritising travel following COVID-19. We know the virus poses a greater risk and higher mortality rates for those over 70. There is speculation that low demand, along with the psychological after-effects of confinement may be leading consumers to modify their behaviour, particularly those facing higher health risks. It may be that there is a generation of people that do not return to travel in the way they did before COVID-19. When considering the expectations of future passengers, moreover, carbon reduction is known to be a priority.
Another shift has been the rise of Zoom and other electronic means of communication. Many businesses, having now hosted and attended meetings online, view such virtual events as a convenient method for saving money and carbon. Where businesses previously had the ‘ESCR’ vision and stated intentions, their employees are now well-practised in the zero-carbon alternative.
Yet alongside this, aviation has a history of not only rebounding from crises quickly but surpassing previous demand levels. It is difficult to know what will happen with passenger demand this time. But if New Zealand’s experience is any indication, the return to Level 2, re-generating regional movement, resulted in strong early growth of domestic passenger numbers.
Growing discourse
COVID-19 has accelerated a growing discourse challenging the status quo. Discussion increasingly focuses on the question: how do we rebuild in a way that benefits the economy, the environment, and improves equality?
A recent report from the Oxford Review of Economic Policy nicely captures post-COVID-19 reconsiderations;
“Public support for action on climate change increased to a peak prior to the pandemic; government and corporate action was also gathering momentum. COVID-19 has clearly slowed this momentum, not least in delaying the international conference on climate (COP26) from 2020 to 2021. However, the momentum could find new impetus if, humbled by the ability of ‘natural’ forces to shock the global economy, humans recalibrate our sense of omnipotence. Furthermore, opinion polls in many countries show that people are noticing the clean air, uncongested roads, the return of birdsong and wildlife, and are asking whether ‘normal’ was good enough; could we not ‘build back better’? The shape of COVID-19 fiscal recovery packages put in place in the coming months, once lockdowns are eased, will have a significant impact on whether globally agreed climate goals are met.”[4]
Whether these opportunities are realised then becomes a political question.
Political considerations
To what extent is the issue a tension between the economy and the environment? Consider, at the national level, the approach taken during COVID-19 in relation to public health vs the economy. For those countries showing signs of relative success, they approached health and the economy as interdependent, not competing concepts in a zero-sum framework. In short, we need healthy people to have a healthy economy. The same can be said for the environment.
For those governments that accept the premise of an interdependent environment and economy, the debate revolves around the best methodology for supporting our economy and environment – whether it be government-led or market-led solutions.
In New Zealand, the current Government believes the way to effectively regulate emissions is at the national level. This is supported by the work of the Climate Commission, the Ministry for the Environment and the Environmental Protection Authority, all of these supported by a National Emissions Budget and a National Emissions Reduction Plan that together address New Zealand’s UNFCCC obligations.
In terms of government stimulus packages, this would ideally mean investing in projects with high potential for both economic recovery and climate impact, the requirement being to satisfy both boxes (i.e. clean physical infrastructure, building efficient retrofits, investment in education/ training, natural capital investment, and clean research and development).[5]
The alternative approach is to allow market-based solutions to solve the climate crisis and rely on the aviation industry to be wholly responsible for developing technology-based solutions. At a time when the industry is facing around 90% revenue loss, this is simply implausible.
Conclusion
The aviation sector is at a crossroad, and the pathway chosen needs to be modern, progressive, and climate-conscious.
Continuing as it was before the health pandemic will, in light of the climate crisis, be neither possible nor acceptable. The future for global aviation depends upon it being an active participant in climate action. The good news is that there is a sectoral awareness of this.
There is no future for an industry that does not address fossil-fuel dependency and, despite the global pandemic, it is imperative that the aviation sector does not lose sight of its carbon-reduction goals.
Yet the sector cannot do it alone. International climate frameworks addressing aviation will need to back the ambitious options, and governments will need to include environmental strings for all sector loans or bail-outs.
Finally, and perhaps above all, individual consumers will need to accept, if they wish to fly, that they should be paying the true cost of flying – which must include finding a way out of fossil-fuel dependency.
Footnotes:
[1] Watts, J. ‘Something in the Air: Could COVID-19 crisis be the catalyst for greening our airlines?’, The Guardian Weekly, 22 May 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/17/is-covid-19-crisis-the-catalyst-for-the-greening-of-worlds-airlines
[2] ACI Europe Working Paper – “Off the Ground”; Report of the WS1 – Sustainability – Climate Change
[3] UK Court of Appeal on 27 Feb 2020 https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Heathrow-summary-of-judgments-26-February-2020-online-version.pdf
[4] Hepburn, C; O’Callaghan, B; Stern. N; Stiglitz, J; and Zenghelis, D. (2020), ‘Will C-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on Climate Change?, Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
[5] Hepburn, C; O’Callaghan, B; Stern. N; Stiglitz, J; and Zenghelis, D. (2020), ‘Will C-19 fiscal recovery packages accelerate or retard progress on Climate Change?, Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
by Claire Waghorn | Jun 18, 2020 | Board
International aviation has landed – abruptly.
The global COVID-19 pandemic has seen closed borders, on-going travel restrictions, decreasing passenger demand, airline lay-offs and bankruptcy. It is undoubtedly the biggest challenge the aviation industry has faced, to date.
Yet this is not the greatest challenge the industry will face. COVID-19 has acted as a magnifying glass, bringing into focus vulnerabilities within the sector, most notably how aviation will respond to the global climate crises. There is always a lag between necessary technological advancements and the capacity to see these through. Right now, they seem to be increasingly at odds.
So what future does aviation have in a post-COVID 19 world? In this first of two parts, I discuss the international framework designed to assist aviation with sector emissions reduction, and how COVID-19 has challenged this.
ICAO climate goals
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) sets out the current science and collective responsibilities for global greenhouse gas emissions. The UN specialised agency for aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), guides the aviation sector towards a consensus on standards and recommended practice to address its responsibility for 3% of global emissions.
To that end, ICAO introduced, in 2020, two principal goals;
- improve fuel efficiency annually by 2% from 2010 on; and
- achieve carbon neutral growth from 2020.
Carbon neutrality is not an ambitious goal, but a realistic one – the intention being to reduce emissions and improve efficiencies to the greatest extent possible, then off-set any remaining emissions. While off-setting can be viewed as a ‘band-aid solution’ for aviation, it is necessary to buy time while fossil-free technology catches up.
To achieve carbon-neutral growth, the ‘four-pillar strategy’ was introduced, mandating operational improvements, aircraft technology improvements, sustainable aviation fuels, and market-based measures in order to oversee off-setting requirements for international flights. The graph below demonstrates the ICAO strategy – pre-COVID-19.
Figure 1 ICAO ‘four pillars’ for reducing International Aviation net carbon emissions
Operational improvements
Operational improvements are the industry’s carbon reduction ‘low hanging fruit’. This includes introduction of ground power for airlines – where an aircraft can plug in to electricity, ideally generated from renewable sources, while parked on the ground, rather than burn jet fuel in their auxiliary power unit.
Likewise, improvements in air traffic management systems, such as New Zealand’s ‘New Southern Skies’ initiative, allows planes to take off and land with minimal waiting time, resulting in further emission reduction.
As airlines are encouraged back, and contracts are renegotiated between airports and airlines, there is an opportunity to mandate greater adoption of emission-saving technology. And it should be an easy sell – such operational improvements present both environmental benefits and cost savings. For example:
If an A320 is plugged in to ground-power for 5 hours per day, over 365 days of the year:
- The cost = US $6,000 p.a., compared to the cost of Jet A1 fuel US $130,000 p.a.
Result:
- Total annual cost savings = US $124,000
- Total annual emission saving = 730 tonnes CO2-e p.a.
Aircraft Technology
The aircraft technology pillar develops steps to create more efficient aircraft operations, with the end-goal of developing electric aviation that is no longer dependent on fossil fuel.
Compared to aircraft of the 1960s, aircraft types today demonstrate an 80% efficiency improvement. Airlines have made progress in reducing emissions through maintaining a fuel-efficient fleet, the fitting of ‘sharklets’, improving approach pathways and departure climb profiles, and reducing aircraft weight.[1] But aircraft fuel-efficiency gains are plateauing[2], and the goal now must be to move beyond fossil fuel by introducing climate-friendly technology.
It is estimated that electric aviation technology would be available to the domestic market in the 2030s, with long-haul electric technology still much further afield. Pre-COVID-19, responsibility for developing low-carbon aviation technology sat with the aeroplane and engine manufacturers, but it is difficult to see how that will play out now.
So there is considerable risk that electric aviation development may be deferred. If the aviation sector is at risk of falling behind with critical climate dependent innovations, and carbon emissions from long-haul flights no longer palatable, it is likely small island nations (that don’t have cross-border rail alternatives) will bear the brunt of disconnection.
Sustainable aviation fuels
Sustainable aviation fuels (SAF) generate lower carbon emissions than conventional aviation kerosene – from production to consumption. These fuels function in the same way as traditional jet fuel, so they do not require significant changes to aircraft or infrastructure. SAF will slow carbon emissions in the short- to medium-term, as new technologies (such as electric or hydrogen) are developed.
Without ready access to an approved SAF, there are limited future carbon reduction opportunities available. If we considered Air New Zealand’s domestic flights (take-off and landing within New Zealand) in FY/2019, they produced a total 556,404 tonnes CO2-e. Allowing a blend mix of up to 50% SAF with fossil jet fuel over a year ANZ can reduce those emissions by 214,215 tonnes CO2-e.[3]
The COVID-19 global lockdown effect on the price of oil has resulted in record lows (minus US $40 per barrel).
This may have an impact on the development of SAF, as feasibility studies demonstrate a dependence on rising oil prices to make their business cases stack up. Germany, France and the UK have flagged the development of SAF as an industry for critical growth as part of their COVID-19 recovery strategies.
Market-based measures
The Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) has been developed as a single global market-based measure, to make up the residual emissions gap after operational, aviation technology and sustainable fuel improvements are made.
CORSIA addresses the increase in total CO2 emissions from international aviation above 2019/2020 baseline data. Noting domestic aviation emissions fall within the responsibility of national emissions reduction frameworks (i.e. the implementation side of the UNFCCC Nationally Determined Contributions).
Under CORSIA, airlines will be required to buy carbon offsets to compensate for their growth in CO2 emissions from 2021 onwards. Participation until 2026 was ‘opt in’ at nation-state level, including New Zealand and the majority of OECD countries[4], but not China. From 2026 onwards, CORSIA then becomes compulsory, with the exception of very small island nations such as our Pacific neighbours.
Following the COVID-19 outbreak and subsequent grounding of international aviation, the inclusion of 2019/2020 emissions as baseline data is now being challenged by industry group ‘International Air Transport Association’ (IATA), in favour of using 2019 data alone. In terms of climate, the use of 2019 data alone sits alongside a return to business-as-usual behaviour. This may risk stranding investments in emission reductions and undermining investor confidence in aviation’s commitment to a low carbon future, including sustainable aviation fuels.[5]
The inclusion of 2020 data would be a game-changer for aviation’s carbon footprint, albeit an extremely challenging one for the airlines. The inclusion of the 2020 anomaly within baseline data would require either material reduction in sector emissions or paying the price for carbon-growth, effective immediately.
Conclusion
Before the ‘global grounding’, international aviation growth was pushing up against global emission reduction goals, which makes the decisions being made now even more crucial to the future of the industry – and the planet. Airlines, airports, government bail-out conditions, ICAO goals, and the CORSIA baseline will all collectively determine whether the aviation sector framework is future fit-for-purpose in a climate conscious world.
Beyond the international framework, we also have a changing global mindset to consider – a COVID-19 induced review of the way we live and interact on our finite planet. More on this in Pt II.
Footnotes:
[1] Scion, New Zealand Biofuels Roadmap Summary Report: https://www.scionresearch.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/63293/Biofuels_summary_report.pdf
[2]Green Air, ‘New aircraft fuel efficiency improvements return to historical average but lag ICAO fuel burn goals, finds ICCT Report (18 Sept 2015), https://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=2130
[3] Scion, New Zealand Biofuels Roadmap Summary Report: https://www.scionresearch.com/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/63293/Biofuels_summary_report.pdf
[4] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Commonly used in place of the term ‘developed’ nations, to indicate nations with relatively well developed economies.
[5] EDF, ‘Covid-19, International Aviation and Climate Change: How Airlines’ Proposed Re-Write of International Civil Aviation Organisation Rules would Undermine the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Schedule for International Aviation, (May 2020), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/Impact_of_COVID_on_International_Aviation_Analysis.pdf
by Abbas Nazari | May 28, 2020 | Young Global Scholars Group
Extremism, in all its forms – political, religious, ethnic, gender, generational – is, in short, an extreme version of a belief system. It can be promoted peacefully, and within the normal bounds of freedom of speech. And it can, of course, spill over into hate speech and physical violence.
What to do about the second version? The digital revolution that is upon us has made this issue inordinately more challenging.[1]
There are two lenses for perceiving the threat of violent extremism and developing a viable counter-strategy – global and national. The relationship between these two levels is critical to success.
So, how are we doing?
Violent extremism and UN collective security
The United Nations has been wrestling with extremism for decades now, in fact since the ‘60s. Recent milestones along the way include the following:
- The UN Global Counter-terrorism Strategy, adopted by the General Assembly in 2006 (A/Res/60/288), reviewed in 2008 (A/Res/62/272) and 2010 (A/Res/64/297), and most recently in 2016 (A/Res/70/291);
- Some twelve treaties on terrorism that identify about fifty offences, for Member States to translate into domestic criminal law;[2]
- Security Council resolutions 1624 (2005), 2178 of (2014), 2242 (2015) and 2050 (2015), and 2354 (2017).
Essentially, the UN work, in the name of a collective (global) security, aims to promote both a peaceful strategy towards the non-violent version (based on inclusiveness, mutual understanding and a counter-narrative), and the authorized use of force against the violent versions (especially focusing on Daesh (ISIL) and the new concept of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’).[3]
The success of the UN strategy, however, rests on the ability of the major powers to unify, or integrate, or at least collaborate on, their separate political goals and strategic interests into the one ‘collective security interest.[4] Not an easy thing to achieve.
Take the UN member state with the single biggest influence on counter-terrorism strategy – the US, where I happen to be currently studying these issues.
Violent extremism and US national strategy
The most important weakness in the American effort against extremists, the experience shows, is a lack of cohesive strategy and executive decision-making at all levels of the US Government.
The dynamic interplay between the political cycle, societal changes and military strategy creates a conflicting and disjointed approach in the fight against extremists, providing them with oxygen, while draining popular support and mounting a significant financial and human toll.
If one thing has emerged from the ‘war on terror’, it is that a consistent American strategy against the extremists is non-existent.
This is due to the interrelated and often conflicting elements of the US political cycle, wavering public support, and a military strategy that requires consistency of effort and endless financial support. These dueling elements mean that no administration is afforded the time, nor the space, to clearly plan and execute a strategy that is long-lasting and would lead to success (if success is even defined in any measurable way).
The lengthy election cycle requires administrations to demonstrate to the public that they are working to defeat the enemy and bring troops home. But this undermines the military effort, which is naturally lengthier and requires significant financial and human investment.
Meanwhile, public pressure grows against the mounting financial cost of any campaign, human rights abuses and the risk to American troops. Eventually, a midpoint is reached, where the administration is neither fully committed to the strategy (if it has been defined in any way), nor willing to withdraw conclusively.
This develops into a self-fulfilling downward spiral; where decision-making becomes reactive rather than proactive, and the extremists gain an upper hand simply by biding their time.
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that domestic concerns outweigh foreign policy issues during elections, and leaders either delay or make a halfhearted decision in order to not let the war take up further oxygen from the ‘winnable’ issues. If we require a graphic demonstration of the points made here, they are perfectly outlined in the Rolling Stones article on General Stanley McChrystal and in the Afghanistan papers which show the clear lack of strategy and plain deception in the Afghan war.
To further illustrate this lack of strategy, let us observe the American effort against Al-Qaeda (AQ). Successive administrations dating back to George H W Bush did not have a solid understanding of Islamic extremism following the 1992 Yemen hotel bombings.
When the operation in Afghanistan (2002) was launched, the strategy seemed to be defined clearly; capture those responsible for the attack and destroy a base of operations. But this morphed into regime change and nation-building. This was further complicated by the invasion of Iraq (2003), which had all the hallmarks of the Afghan conflict, with the added elements of sectarianism and counterinsurgency. The irony is that the Afghan conflict was authorized by the UN, whereas the Iraq operation was not (being described, in fact, by the Secretary-General at the time as ‘illegal’).
With both conflicts stretching far beyond their expected and announced timelines, the American strategy (again, still not defined in any way) was to look to a political solution to enable a peaceful withdrawal. This was achieved to an elementary level in Iraq, but no sooner had American troops left than a more fearsome enemy in the form of Daesh sprouted.
In Afghanistan, the conflict seems to be neutralized with the recent signing of the peace deal with the Taliban, but almost two decades and trillions of dollars later, this is a tentative and shaky deal at best. Sadly, in both cases, the decision to pursue the diplomatic solution over the military option came after the loss of countless lives.
By committing or de-committing to a strategy that was just incoherent and lacked clarity, it is clear that the biggest weakness in the Americans strategy against the extremists is the lack of cohesive strategy and executive decision-making at all levels of the US Government, which undermines cohesion in the UN collective effort.
All UN member states, not least the Security Council’s ‘permanent five’, should heed the lessons, as they no doubt have been, for some time now.
[1] Beyond anything we have seen”: beheading videos and the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS, Simone M. Friis in International Affairs 91: 4, July 2015, pp. 725–46.
[2] International treaties against terrorism and the use of terrorism during armed conflict and by armed forces, D. O’Donnell, in Red Cross International Review, Vol. 88, No. 864 (Dec. 2006)
[3] Preventing violent extremism through the UN: The rise and fall of a good idea; David H. Ucko, in International Affairs 94: 2 (2018) 251–270
[4] The Security Council and Counter-terrorism: Global & regional approaches, Kennedy Graham, in Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 17 (Routledge; 2005), pp. 37–65
by Ashutosh Misra | May 17, 2020 | Guests
The title-phrase derives from Hindu scripture. It is found in the Upanishads, and the full verse remains engraved on the entrance to the Parliament of India. Essentially, the world is one family.
For centuries, the phrase has shaped India’s spiritual and egalitarian outlook and, during contemporary independence, the country’s diplomatic and foreign policy contours. No wonder that this ancient philosophy also characterises India’s fight against Covid-19.
We live in extraordinary times. Who would have thought it – that neither the ‘US pivot’ in the Indo-Pacific nor China’s Belt and Road Initiative is proving to be the game-changer in our contemporary world, but rather an anti-malarial drug, deferentially known as ‘hydroxychloroquine’ (or HCQ).
So much is being made of the ‘strategic stand-off’ between the US and China, two of some 200 nation-states whose inhabitants comprise the global community. Such excessive focus is, I believe, a trifle precious.
Actually, with 4.5 m. global cases and 0.3 m. deaths currently, there are, I suggest, two indelible impressions for posterity in the global public memory. And these are:
- how so much of the Western world, venerated for its medical science and public healthcare, has become the lingering epicentre of the scourge, for whatever reason(s); and
- the extent to which India, with 17% of the world population (1.3 b.) and underdeveloped public healthcare, has become a symbol of inspirational leadership with a humane touch, in the face of significant adversity.
Michael Ryan (WHO Exec. Director) noted back in early March how imperative it was that India, with its huge population, successfully tackled the virus, and showed the way forward to the world. In fact, this reflected a not unreasonable trust in India’s capabilities, given its successful record in eradicating smallpox and polio.
A brief review of early action by India:
- Late January: The first Covid-19 case is reported in Kerala, introduced by a traveller from the Middle East. Numbers begin to multiply, as flights bring returnees from Europe and South-east Asia.
- March 3, the Government announces mandatory screening of all arriving air passengers, while a general health advisory was issued to seek medical help if one felt unwell.
- March 1: Vessels and cruise-ships are subject to strict standard operating procedures, including thermal screening at ports.
- March 12: The Delhi Government shuts schools, malls, cinema halls, universities, and bans any gathering of over 50 people, advising people to work from home.
- March 15: Prime Minister Modi (who, according to Nobel Laureate Dr Amartya Sen, was the quickest among world leaders in identifying the dangers of the pandemic) closes India’s land borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
- March 18: A 14-day quarantine policy is put in place for all incoming travellers. At the same time, recognising the importance of the early support of 1.3 b. people, Prime Minister Modi in a national address the following day issues nine ‘calls to action’ including social distancing measures, working from home, and personal hygiene advisories.
- March 22: In an overwhelming show of public solidarity, the Indian nation observes a public curfew (self-quarantine) from 7 am to 9 pm. Emulating Spain and Italy, some 5 m. people clap, ring bells, blow conches, and beat utensils to thank the healthcare, police, and other essential service personnel for their stellar role in dealing with the pandemic onslaught.
Of course, not everything has gone smoothly:
- March 13: the Tablighi Jamaat, a fundamentalist missionary sect, congregates in New Delhi, contravening the Lockdown and generating about a third of India’s coronavirus cases over subsequent weeks as attendees disperse across the country.
- March 24: Somewhat spooked by the 21-day nation-wide lockdown orders, thousands of daily wage-earners amass along the Delhi border, returning to their original homes, creating a flash humanitarian crisis for the country. While most are subsequently ferried on various modes of transport, a large number make the long walk home, creating heart-wrenching scenes of human plight, not seen in a long time in India.
Amidst such dramatic events, on 5 April India again responds to the Prime Minister’s call to observe an ‘Earth-hour Equivalent’ initiative, switching off lights at 9 pm for 9 minutes and lighting candles, torches and oil lamps to dispel the metaphorical ‘darkness’ caused by Covid-19. While sceptics ridicule the event as nothing but blind faith and superstition, it nonetheless demonstrates a unity of purpose – a much-needed virtue for any nation in testing times.
While India faced a Herculean task of safeguarding so many lives while minimising the economic impact, it remaines sensitive to the well-being of the wider world. In mid-February onwards, Modi holds marathon telephone conversations with national leaders – in Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, EU, France, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Nepal, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, (State of) Palestine, Sweden, Thailand, Uganda, UAE, UK, US and Vietnam – to discuss joint strategies against Covid-19, and offering necessary support in the crisis.
A lesser known fact is that on 26 February a special Indian air force flight had carried 15 tonnes of Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs) to Wuhan at the request of President Xi Xinping. On return, it ferries 76 Indians, 23 Bangladeshis, 6 Chinese, two nationals each from Myanmar and Maldives, and one each from South Africa, USA and Madagascar – all stranded in ‘ground-zero’.
As Delhi goes into complete lockdown on 12 March, India undertakes further initiatives:
- hosts, at prime ministerial level, a ‘virtual’ regional SAARC initiative against Covid-19, and founds a SAARC Emergency Fund with a $10 m. contribution from India to help regional states deal with the pandemic;
- puts a Rapid Response Team of doctors and specialists with testing kits and PPEs on standby to be flown out to help;
- offers online training capsules for emergency response; and sharing of software for the Integrated Disease Surveillance Portal (Arogya Setu), a variant of which has been adopted by many states affected by the pandemic, including Australia;
- convenes a senior health professional SAARC meeting to strengthen intra-regional cooperation across South Asia.
Praise for India’s SAARC initiative, the first of any regional initiative, came from the Australian PM, who urged a similar G-20 initiative (which occurred on March 26). It was a critical and much-needed initiative considering the grouping’s startling statistics—90% of the Covid-19 cases and 88% of deaths have been reported from the G-20 group of nations, which constitutes 80% of global GDP and 60% of population.
In early April, Modi and Morrison also hold an extensive telephone consultation, sharing a mutual commitment to build research collaboration for vaccine development and ensuring a safe return of all stranded citizens. Morrison especially, emphasises that Indian students would be provided all the necessary support and were a ‘vibrant a part of Australia’.
Morrison was essentially backpedalling on earlier remarks that Indian students who could not afford staying during the social distancing phase should return. This had created tension between the two sides, in the context of nearly $A6 b. contribution from Indian students to Australia’s education industry. The most noteworthy outcome of Modi-Morrison conversation was agreement to hold the first-ever ‘virtual summit’ to discuss a joint anti-Covid-19 strategy, and the potential evolution of the Indo-Pacific regional architecture in the post-pandemic phase.
On 28 April, India attends the video meeting of the BRICS foreign ministers to share India’s anti-Covid measures including, Arogya Setu disease surveillance portal, Prime Minister’s Citizen Assistance and Relief fund (PM Cares), SAARC Covid-19 Information Exchange Platform (COINEX) and pharmaceutical assistance extended to other countries.
India has so far supplied HCQ and anti-pyretic paracetamol to over 85 countries, including 25 nations in Africa alone. While the US President issues a retaliatory note if India declines the supplies, the President of Brazil expresses gratitude for India’s easing of restrictions on HCQ exports, comparing the gesture with the legend of Hanuman, the monkey god in Hindu mythology, who had carried Sanjeevani (medicine) from the Himalayas to save the life of Lord Rama’s wounded brother, in the battle against the demons in Lanka.
India, a producer of nearly 10% of the world’s low-cost generic drugs including HCQ, also despatches medical teams along with PPEs and medical supplies to Kuwait, Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros and Seychelles to deal with the pandemic, as a part of ‘Mission Sagar (ocean)’, inspired by PM Modi’s vision of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region. Back in 2004, India had undertaken a similar humanitarian, search and rescue mission in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami that had devastated the Indian Ocean littorals.
Keeping an eye on the Indo-Pacific, India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla holds discussions with the newly formulated ‘Quad-plus’ counterparts in Australia, South Korea, Vietnam, Japan and New Zealand. The common aim is to synergise joint efforts in developing a vaccine, rescue stranded citizens, and discuss ways of insulating the economy from the pandemic’s impact and kick-start the struggling national economies. The group now interacts weekly to keep up with the fast-paced developments.
On 3 May, the Prime Minister participates in the Non-Aligned Movement virtual summit, themed ‘United against Covid-19’. And on 13 May, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar holds talks with counterparts in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to share India’s anti-Covid measures including, a $US266 b. stimulus package (10% of India’s GDP) to revive the economy, make India self-reliant, and provide the much needed sustenance to struggling businesses and citizenry.
India’s ‘glocal’ approach – combining local measures with its ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ global response approach against the pandemic – has drawn broad accolade from world leaders. This has been reinforced by various commentators who have offered their own take on the pandemic:
- Francis Fukuyama (The Atlantic) maintains that “citizens must believe that their government has the expertise, technical knowledge, capacity, and impartiality to make the best available judgments”. He observed that Lincoln, Wilson, and Theodore Roosevelt all enjoyed a high level of public trust – which is missing today in the US.
- Henry Kissinger (Wall Street Journal) emphasises that ‘public trust is crucial to social solidarity’, and the response should be global and collaborative;
- Fareed Zakaria (Indian TV interview) identifies ‘credibility and trust’ as the two key elements in any leadership to tackle a challenge of this nature successfully.
India’s effective ‘glocal’ response to COVID-19, synergising local through national to global levels of cooperation, draws its thrust from these two elements.
Dr Misra (MA, Banaras Hindu University; PhD, Jawaharlal Nehru University) is CEO of the Institute for Australia India Engagement, based in Brisbane and affiliated with the Griffith Asia Institute. Previous positions include the UN University Leadership Academy (Jordan) and research-adviser to the Indian Parliament and governmental agencies.
by Sundeep Waslekar | May 8, 2020 | Guests
The international community of states, today, is so heavily engaged in deadly rivalry and competition that we have forgotten the idea of global unity and cooperation. The latter is, however, a precondition of human survival.
The year 2020 began with Avangard finding its place in the Russian defence forces. It is the world’s most sophisticated hypersonic glide vehicle. It travels at 27 times speed of sound on the top of an ICBM carrying a 2 Mt. nuclear payload. It cannot be detected by the American missile shield as it determines its own flight path. Russia has now acquired an edge in its arms race with the United States.
Avangard is the latest addition to the arsenal of hypersonic missiles, lethal autonomous weapons, earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, cyber-weapons, and China’s DF-100 missile which can bust an aircraft carrier. The growing stockpile of arms is bringing us closer to our collective death. But nobody is paying attention.
Whether it is lethal arms, pandemics, trade or global warming, we seem to forget that cooperation alone can help us find a way out of the predicament we have created for ourselves.
China and the United States have excelled in levelling acrimonious charges and counter-charges over the spread of Covid-19. China accuses the US armed forces of carrying the infection to Wuhan. The US blames China for deliberately holding back the information on the outbreak.
The foreign ministers of the two countries were together in a hotel in Munich (14-16 Feb.) two weeks after the WHO declared a global health emergency and only a month before most of the world brought the global economy to a standstill. But there is no indication of them constructively exploring collaborative solutions to contain the pandemic. Nor is there evidence of the world leaders endeavouring to produce a joint action plan immediately after the WHO’s proclamation.
The failure to cooperate is not confined to the ongoing pandemic. We have seen it in the handling of trade disputes and climate change. As for the post-nuclear arms race nobody will talk about it. Until, that is, the Cuban Missile Crisis recurs. Or will that be the Korean Missile Crisis, next time?
It may appear that nation-states are losing their ability to manage global problems. But I wonder if they are losing the will, not merely the competence, to deal with issues that might impair our civilization.
One reason is the tunnel vision of our leadership. They can only see what appears on the screen and not what is there in the CPU.
- If they are obsessed with the corona virus, they ignore hypersonic missiles and lethal autonomous weapons poised to cause Apocalypse, either by intent or accident.
- If they are obsessed with terrorism, they don’t foresee a pandemic even one month before it attacks the world.
- If they are obsessed with trade, they don’t see global warming.
The second reason is their fondness of nationalism. Rabindranath Tagore, an Indian poet and Nobel laureate, described nationalism as a ‘menace’ about a century ago. Around the same time, Albert Einstein called it the ‘measles of mankind’. In modern language, we might call it the ‘corona virus of humankind’.
The third reason is that the international architecture is made of nation-states. What we call the United Nations Organisation is the United Governments Organisation. It does not represent the spirit of humanity. It is a bargaining forum for the nation-states, where each one aims to negotiate and aggrandise its own interests. All other organisations, including the G-20, G-7, World Bank, regional development banks, and Asian International Infrastructure Bank, are all ‘inter-state’ bodies.
The nation-states can decide if they want to swim together, or sink together.
- SARS and Ebola did not cause mayhem because the nation-states promptly decided to cooperate. Covid-19 is causing disaster because the nation-states did not immediately cooperate.
- Global trade and financial flows grow when nation-states facilitate their movement. Goods and money do not flow easily when the leading nation-states use agricultural crops and 5G as the pretext for confrontation.
- Emissions can be contained if nation-states of the world honour their Paris commitments to shift to a low-carbon economy. Emissions do not recognise borders; they proliferate around the planet when nation-states refuse to think beyond their national boundaries.
There is a serious risk of human civilization being ravaged in a nuclear or post–nuclear war, impaired on account of climate change, suspended due to attacks of viruses, or hit by a biological or technological mishap caused by the grand failure of some, critical, AI mechanism.
If we want to avert these risks, there are two pathways.
- First, in the present architecture, nation-states will need to find ways to trust and work with each other, in a constructive and genuine way.
- Secondly, we shall have to conceive of a global-governance grid that is beyond the horizon of the United Nations, and which does not depend on the representation of the nation-states. It must represent, and serve, only humankind.
Both are formidable challenges. They may appear utopian when our nationalism, our vanity, and our greed, are on full display.
We have a rather ‘lazy habit’ of finding solutions to the world’s problems once world wars ravage millions of people. If a nuclear bomb, a deadly virus, or an ecological disaster annihilates one billion out of eight billion inhabitants on our planet, we will certainly begin our journey on these pathways.
Do we want to wait until such a tragedy happens?
It is a call for our collective wisdom, our morality, and our conscience.
by Tapio Kanninen and Georgios Kostakos | May 7, 2020 | International Advisory Panel
In Part I, we focused primarily on the effort of the UN and WHO, and its relationship with some of the major member states. In this part, we explore in more depth the internal dynamics of those powerful countries.
National responses – ideological and political
In terms of national responses to the pandemic, beyond the purely health-related part, which is broadly aligned to WHO guidance, we have so far noticed a rather complex political and ideological landscape:
- Some authoritarian-leaning leaders – Orban of Hungary, for example – have used the opportunity to strengthen their grip on power and rule by decree.
- The US President has used the crisis to issue an executive order to ban migration to the United States, a political platform thought to be a key to his re-election in November.
- A lack of transparency or credibility regarding the infection rates in China, Russia (and more so North Korea) is complicating a systematic worldwide response.
Conspiracy theories have once again become more common among a besieged and insecure citizenry mostly on the right wing of the political spectrum.
- The left is blamed at congressional and state levels for the handling of the pandemic in the US, with some Trump supporters taking to the streets to demand the immediate lifting of “shelter-in-place” orders. Civil liberties are in danger with an extended government power grab through shutdowns, they claim. The President tweeted that some states should be ‘liberated’ – a thought that was echoed by Elon Musk, reacting to the closure of Tesla’s primary factory.
- Fox News prime-time anchor Laura Ingraham, a confidant of the President, also thinks that the democrats are initiating a “viral path to socialism”, possible a theme in the coming presidential debate.
Some conspiracy theory professionals, whether on the right or left, have become hyperactive:
- First, there is a claim that coronavirus statistics and projections are manipulated to sow panic among the public, giving a free pass to those internationalists and liberals who want to institute a monstrous police state.
- There are also claims that the virus might have started in a Wuhan laboratory rather than through jumping from animals to humans, as is the current scientific consensus. In this line of thinking the Australian Prime Minister has asked for an international investigation into the origins of the virus, and has got the backing of the US Secretary of State.
- Bill Gates, along with his foundation, has become a target of many fierce conspiracy theorists, partly because he was able to predict the onset of a similar pandemic already (2015) and did co-organize a coronavirus exercise in October ’19, just a few months before the crisis started.
Some, mostly on the political right, argue that the socio-economic costs of the lockdown and social distancing are worse than the spread of the virus itself. On the other hand, one liberal welfare state has not instituted as strict a lockdown as its neighbours – the final results of this ‘experiment’ will be of interest beyond Sweden.
The US President continues to give mixed messages on these issues, complicating a systematic response from the federal government. State governors are partly left to fend for themselves and they respond by creating their own coalitions or even smaller federations within the US.
Some observers see in all this the end of ‘American exceptionalism’, since the country has managed the pandemic so badly compared to others, with high cases and fatalities, and huge unemployment.
What of the political ‘left’?
In the US, the putative Democratic presidential candidate has said that the crisis provided “an opportunity now to significantly change the mindset of the American people, things they weren’t ready to do, you know, even two, three years ago”. He mentioned universal healthcare, plus the need to emulate the New Deal of the 1930s, obviously taking on board many elements of the Green New Deal supported by the US ‘democratic socialists’.
In the EU, an informal European Alliance for a Green Recovery has been launched with the participation of members of the European Parliament from across the political spectrum, business leaders, trade unions, think-tanks and NGOs. The initiative aims to build a post-virus economy based on green recovery, climate neutrality and the protection of biodiversity. The initiative is led by the chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.
The geopolitics of COVID-19: a ‘new world order’?
Henry Kissinger recently suggested that ’The Coronavirus Pandemic Will Forever Alter the World Order’. This is likely to be true, and he is not alone. But where do the biggest stakes lie, in determining which way the ‘New World Order’ develops?
First benchmark will be the US election (November ‘20). If the Democrats win the presidency plus a congressional majority, the US may well return to its traditional leadership role in shaping, and contributing to the international system, along with planning more effectively for future crises.
A second critical variable is China’s future. Facing a sober economic outlook, albeit with air pollution temporarily diminished, will that enormous country begin to experience turbulence such as that occurring in Hong Kong? Or, with the US in decline, will China’s authoritarian system prove to be effective in filling the global leadership vacuum that currently exists, and also in controlling its own precarious social situation, at least in the short-term?
And thirdly, what of the European Union? Will it manage to unite in solidarity around its most virus-affected regions and will it use its Green Deal to exit from the crisis, or will it simply fade to insignificance? If the former, it may prove to be the third pole that balances the US and China, and provides a more benign “third way” to global leadership by its internal example and by supporting international institutions. If it proves incurably weak, it may well become a battleground in the rivalry of the two superpowers.
One thing is clear: in light of all this, the world, its geopolitics and global governance after COVID-19, will not be the same as before.
The extent to which change to the contemporary international system will be influenced by constructive or destructive forces remains something that only the future will tell.
by Tapio Kanninen and Georgios Kostakos | May 6, 2020 | International Advisory Panel
How have the UN and other international organizations – and indeed the whole global governance system – responded to the COVID-19 outbreak? What are we learning from this response?
Back in 2010 we examined (Journal of International Organizations Studies) whether, and how well, the UN system can address the interconnected challenges of today and tomorrow. The effectiveness of the system – mechanisms and operating procedures – was measured against its core functions: early warning, policy-planning, decision-making, coordination, implementation, and support for intergovernmental processes.
The study showed there is only partial readiness, and partial or no integration in the implementation, of these core functions across departments and agencies in the face of emerging, interconnected global challenges. In crisis situations the UN Secretary-General has to make use of existing bodies through ad hoc combinations, which may produce sub-optimal results.
Specifically, how have the WHO and the major states responded to the crisis? We offer below some observations on the ideological and political character of those responses. And we explore how the international system might be expected to change as a result.
The WHO response, and the criticism
Because of the medical nature of this crisis, the main response, in the initial stages at least, was expected to come and indeed came from the WHO. As soon as China notified it of the existence of a cluster of atypical pneumonia cases in Wuhan (31 Dec. ’19), WHO procedures were set in motion.
While China was the first to encounter and document the challenge, the official problem-identification and designation as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), came from the WHO, in late-January ‘20.
This relative delay has been criticised by some, notably the US President who saw it as a result of WHO ‘kowtowing’ to China, the most populous country and second biggest national economy in the world but a very small contributor to the WHO budget, 0.21% compared to the US 14.67%. the President “[placed] a hold on all funding to the WHO while its mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic is investigated”.
In defence, WHO and many supporting it, point to the systematic steps taken to establish the nature and significance of the threat, including with a WHO field mission to Wuhan, the convening of an Emergency Committee of independent experts from around the world, and the progressive raising of the alarm. They also point to China’s cooperation, including by sharing the genetic sequence of the virus, all in January 2020.
Concerning the threat identification phase, apparent ”competitors” to the WHO / country-of-origin cooperation had been the secret services of the US. Without getting into conspiracy theory, it has been credibly argued that the US President had received warning through his intelligence services as early as November 2019 that “a contagion was sweeping China’s Wuhan region”.
In terms of awareness-raising, once the WHO had received the initial notification, it issued regular updates for specialists and the broader public. These were intensified with regular briefings held by the WHO Director-General and senior associates.
A further initiative by WHO was to contact the big tech companies (Facebook, Google, Apple) for support in fighting the ‘infodemic’ of fake news about COVID-19. This supplemented efforts by WHO and health authorities around the world to inform the public about the COVID-19 contagion risks and ways to avoid getting sick via spots on TV and radio channels, as well as the internet.
High-level briefings on the fight against the disease thus became a daily occurrence in many countries, with the participation of senior government leaders and top medical experts. An eventual public information coalition gelled around the WHO messaging. Conspiracy theories and the promotion of unscientific treatments did not fully subside, with occasional prominent advocates including the US Presidentwith his apparent chloroquine and bleach obsessions.
Who took the leadership in terms of articulating a clear vision and mobilising significant resources to address the emergency? WHO did produce extensive technical guidance on how to deal with the COVID-19 emergency, for the use of medical services, national authorities and individuals. Controversy did not disappear, as in the case of the use of masks and on travel restrictions. WHO initially advised against imposing bans on air travel, notably from China, something that again infuriated the US in particular, which soon imposed such a ban on Chinese and European travellers as well.
By and large, the WHO did a credible job with the information that it was given. It could have been less diplomatic with China, no doubt, risking the ire of one powerful global actor. It avoided that but stepped on the toes of another major actor, the US which seems bent on fighting a trade war and perhaps a broader cold war with its ‘strategic rival’, keeping also the US election calendar in mind.
No doubt like any international organization and any large bureaucracy, the WHO could have operated more quickly and effectively. So could every UN member state.
Other responses from the international system
While measures were increasingly being taken to contain COVID-19 infections, it became clear that the global economy was coming to a standstill. The result was the outbreak of a second crisis, an economic one, which soon turned into a matter of survival for individuals and companies, both large and small. The response came from national treasuries and central banks, though special handouts and quantitative easing, in the case of the US amounting to several trillions of dollars poured into the economy. The IMF established a credit-line of US$1 tr. for the many countries asking for help.
In the midst of all this, and while the WHO was rightly the visible face of the UN system during the initial, clearly health-related stages of the emergency, the UN Secretary-General entered the arena with various statements. He called on the G-20 to help avert an economic collapse, and on the developed countries to help their counterparts in the developing world deal with the emergency. He also called for a worldwide ceasefire during this period and for attention to the increasing incidents of domestic violence due to home confinement.
Increasingly the focus has turned on the socio-economic consequences of the emergency and the need to ‘recover better’, more sustainably – in the spirit of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs. These and other initiatives, including from UN system agencies, funds and programmes, are presented on the UN web pages dedicated to COVID-19. While the General Assembly passed two resolutions related to COVID-19 – on international cooperation to ensure global access to medicines, vaccines and medical equipment and on global solidarity to face the virus – it is worth noting that the Security Council has been unable to produce any outcome, not even in connection to the pandemic and conflict zones. It is worth recalling UN Headquarters (New York) and its offices elsewhere are also under lockdown because of the crisis.
Actual decision-making on containment and economic revival, therefore, were left to member states – with initially minimal coordination even within tightly-knit groups such as the EU. In many countries, there was disagreement and conflicting decisions between national and sub-national jurisdictions (notably USA, Brazil).
In each case, the health experts advised the political authorities on adjustment measures to suit national circumstances. Further processing of emerging good practices took place through the WHO and reputable health institutes around the world, which remained connected despite a surge in nationalism.
Unfortunately, both the best and the worst of humanity come out in the event of a crisis.
- A perceived lack of solidarity towards Italy by its European partners shook the foundations of the EU and a demand for mutualised debt issuance remains under discussion.
- Offers of support by China, Russia and others are dismissed by some as propaganda gestures, yet welcomed by those directly benefitting.
- A new wave of conspiracy theories which we discuss more below.
What became evident to all was that national resilience has a strong local element which does not necessarily align with the push for more globalised efficiency through cross border supply chains.
There will likely be, in the near future, a strong push for national self-sufficiency as part of the national interest of all states, small and large.
We discuss this in Part II.
