by Abbas Nazari | Mar 4, 2021 | Young Global Scholars Group
In his address to the Munich security conference (his first international speech as president), President Biden told European leaders the US wants to “earn back our position of trusted leadership.” In a clean break from the isolationist policies of his predecessor, President Biden noted that “The last four years have been hard, but Europe and the United States have to lead with confidence once more…I’m sending a clear message to the world: America is back.” And his actions back up his rhetoric. Within the first week, he re-joined the Paris Climate Accord and World Health Organisation, expanded the United States Refugee program, stopped construction of the border wall, revoked the ban on travel from Muslim-majority countries, and joined the global fight against the coronavirus.
But despite these incremental steps, the role of America in the global system remains uncertain. United States leadership has been in decline for many years – the last four were simply the nadir. From its bloody foibles in the Middle East, to its failure to counter Russia, and its missteps in dealing with China, the United States no longer enjoys the unipolarity it enjoyed in the 1990s and 2000s. While Biden’s executive orders have helped undo some of the damage of the past four years, the reputational and strategic damage to American foreign policy and its role in the world will take years to heal. Biden’s claim that America can once more become the beacon of democracy for the world has been met with scepticism if not outright derision, given the deadly insurrection at the Capitol, and the social unrest of 2020.
If America is to truly reassert its role in the global order, then it must focus on the following three issues:
Facing up to domestic issues
America often claims to be a role model for the world. But the last four years, and especially the last year, demonstrated the many cracks in American society that have often been overlooked. The coronavirus pandemic laid bare the enormous inequities at every level of American society. The social unrest following the police killing of George Floyd also showed the fragility of race relations, while the months after the November election showed just how divided the nation has become. Biden’s chest-beating proclamation that America is back will be a hollow cry if his administration cannot address the numerous challenges at home. Given the reputational damage, if America wishes to wag its finger at other countries, then those countries will be quick to remind US officials of its own atrocious human rights record, at home and abroad. In order for America to become the more reputable model that it often claims to be, the Biden administration will need to address its own internal dynamics head-on.
Outlining a clear China strategy
There is no denying that the 21st century will be the Asian century. No American administration, from Bush, to Obama, to Trump has demonstrated a clear and consistent China strategy. Biden needs to chart a different course, but as yet there are few signs he will. China, by all measures is on track to challenge American supremacy in every realm, if it has not done so yet. From quantum computing to artificial intelligence, to being the largest economy, to wielding global influence, China has either caught up or streaked ahead. Competition between the two superpowers will be stiff, but where China has laid out clear five- and ten-year plans for its national development, much of the American political system is geared towards a nebulous cycle of midterm and national elections. Allies, such as Australia, Japan, the UK, and much of the EU, are left rudderless in this void of American vision. Undoubtedly, there will be many in the Biden administration who sense the need to outline a clear China strategy, but whether it is framed as a problem or opportunity remains to be seen. Engaging with China in an effective manner is also a powerful signal for other actors in the international system.
Learning from mistakes
With the war on terror coming to an end, and the US’ imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan, some reflection on the part of American officials is necessary. The War on Terror was an ill-fated and visionless strategy that ultimately became America’s longest military campaign. These ‘forever wars’ have left Americans bloodied, exhausted and poor. Two decades later, peace in Afghanistan is just as tenuous, much of Iraq (and the broader Middle East) is less stable, and America is smaller in the eyes of the world. When US officials rightfully decry the human rights abuses in China and Myanmar, critics will be quick to point out America’s own record. With hawks in the Biden administration circling around Iran, America would be wise to learn from (and hopefully assume responsibility for) its failures.
Indeed, the start of the Biden administration sparks hope after four years which wracked America’s reputation globally and diminished its role in the global order. Biden has gotten off to a hopeful start, and his spate of executive orders have undone some of the damage of his predecessor. However, these are small steps, and a clear vision for America’s role in the global system is still missing. In order to assume a greater role for America, the Biden administration would be wise to face its own demons, to outline and implement a clear long-term China strategy, and to learn from its mistakes. In his inauguration address, President Biden described his vision for America’s role in the world, declaring: “We look ahead in our uniquely American way – restless, bold, optimistic – and set our sights on the nation we know we can be and we must be.” Focusing on the above areas will repair some of the reputational damage and leave America well-placed for this decade and beyond.
by Hugh Steadman | Mar 1, 2021 | Guests
On 22nd January, 2021, the TPNW came into force with the requisite fifty nations having ratified the treaty. Since then, several others, including Cambodia and Philippines have joined. The background has been dealt with at some length in my recent article.
The key component is held at Part II, Article 1 ‘Prohibitions.’ These ‘shalt nots’ seem fairly straightforward. At first sight, full compliance would seem to present few problems for governments that lack the means or inclination ever to aspire to possess nuclear weapons.
However, one item on the list of prohibitions could raise problems for some parties to the treaty and for some others that would become so. Article 1 (e) states that each state party undertakes “never under any circumstances” to “assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party” under the Treaty.
Many non-nuclear nations have decided their security requires aligning with one of the nuclear-armed states, irrespective of whether that state happens to wield nuclear weapons. For these, a careful reading of Article 1, section (e) demands our attention.
As things stand, many non-nuclear weapons states are in formal alliances with one, two or three of the western nuclear weapon states: the US, UK and France. Of these states, the US is especially egregious in its breaches of the TPNW’s prohibitions, and is openly hostile to the TPNW, actively lobbying other nations against signing or ratifying the Treaty.
In return for US protection, allies are expected to allow their territory to be used for – and their military forces to partake in – joint military exercises, military research and development, psyop and intelligence gathering operations. Expenditure is demanded of such allies to make their armed-forces inter-operable with those of their nuclear-armed protector. As Australia, New Zealand and many NATO countries have experienced, the cost of alliance can include participation in such breaches of international law as the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Nuclear weapons are at the apex of US military posture and are continuously in a state of launch readiness. The United States is also in the process of modernising its nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, despite its legal obligations to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is continuously refining and developing new doctrines for their utilisation. The effectiveness of this endeavour is entirely dependent on the technical, tactical and strategic support offered by the totality of the US military machine, including allied capabilities.
Though it could be argued that a nation that provides military assistance to a nuclear power might not be directly ‘assisting, encouraging or inducing’ US nuclear forces, such nations are undeniably providing comfort to other sections of the US military that do. As such, can it be argued that close military alliance with a nuclear armed state that demands military assistance in return, is not permissible under the terms of the TPNW? Some experts in international law argue that it is indeed permissible, but are they allowing too much expediency and flexibility in their interpretation of the Treaty’s provisions?
This question needs to be asked with circumspection. On one hand, countries such as New Zealand currently face no realistic military threat to their territorial integrity such that their own internal resources properly prepared, could not counter. Their alliance with nuclear powers is not driven by a need or desire to shelter under a nuclear umbrella (and indeed New Zealand long ago rejected this arrangement). It is simply an accident of European colonial history that their defence and security policy has tended to align with the West when their national interest would be far better served by neutrality.
On the other hand, the situation of Vietnam, a peaceful ratifier of the Treaty, is rather different. The celebrated three ‘noes’ of its foreign policy: “no military alliances, no aligning with one country against another, and no foreign military bases on Vietnamese soil,” while they could easily be adopted by more isolated states, are problematical for states such as Vietnam, which are in close territorial proximity to potentially hostile nations. Despite this, Vietnam refuses to shelter under anyone’s nuclear umbrella, or give comfort to another nation’s aggressive intent. In stepping forward to be counted among states wishing to contribute to the prohibition of nuclear weapons, Vietnam is helping humanity move genuinely closer to the removal of the existential threat that these weapons pose. Vietnam’s ‘three noes’ and TPNW compliance are examples that many more nations could follow – including, in my opinion, New Zealand.
by Chris Williams | Feb 23, 2021 | International Advisory Panel
What might future historians note as the epoch-making aspects of Donald Trump’s exit? Perhaps it will include something that is attracting less academic attention at present – social media companies closing down Trump’s accounts. Twitter and later Snapchat permanently banned Trump. Facebook and YouTube restricted him, and Amazon closed the alternative Parler app.
Trump was not alone. In March, Twitter and Facebook censored Brazilian President Bolsonaro and Venezuelan President Maduro for promoting misinformation about Covid-19. Facebook also removed accounts linked to the Ugandan government, which seemed to be manipulating the election.
Commercial telecoms companies successfully censored and silenced the President of the USA, and others.
That might not appear remarkable in the crazed context of recent events, but what would we now read in textbooks if the Bell Telephone Company had terminated Teddy Roosevelt, or BBC Ltd. blocked Baldwin. Historian Tim Wander describes the first global broadcast from Marconi’s company by Australian soprano, Dame Nellie Melba, as ‘the moment the world changed’. What words would Wander have used if Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company had pulled the plug on the Pope and his Vatican Radio station, which it set up?
Soon after the tech-termination of Trump, comments from a coalition of the uncomfortable included Angela Merkel’s “problematic”, and Mexico’s President Obrador’s, “I don’t like anybody being censored”. EU commissioner Thierry Breton grumbled that “the fact that a CEO can pull the plug on Potus’ [President of the US] loudspeaker without any checks and balances is perplexing”.
They were joined by Alexei Navalny, critic of Putin, tweeting, “The ban of Donald Trump on Twitter is an unacceptable act of censorship. Of course, Twitter is a private company, but we have seen many examples in Russia and China of such private companies becoming the state’s best friends and the enablers when it comes to censorship.”
Meanwhile, Poland was turning moral panic into amoral action. Prime Minister Morawiecki stated that protecting “freedom of speech” on the internet was a priority, and that, “Censorship is not and cannot be accepted.” Justice Minister Ziobro announced a ‘Freedom of Speech Protection Bill’ regulated by a state ‘Freedom of Speech Council’, which could prevent social media companies deleting content or banning users. Ziobro complained that, “Often, the victims of ideological censorship are also representatives of various groups operating in Poland, whose content is removed or blocked just because they express views and refer to values that are unacceptable.” These ‘values’ were LGBT and women’s rights.
The US media headlined ‘Freedom of Speech’, but editors were reminded that the Constitution’s First Amendment protects the people from the politicians, not vice versa. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and subsequent codes state that ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression…through any media’ (Art. 19). ‘Expression’ simply means distinctly stating a thought, and the UDHR authors could not have envisaged ‘any media’ in the form of social networks.
The European Human Rights Convention (1953) omits ‘any media’ (Art 10) but, like the First Amendment, clarifies that it only precludes interference by a ‘public authority’. Arguably these rights only protect the originator of an ‘opinion’ or ‘expression’, not those who repeat it, and anyway human rights only protect individuals, not groups or organisations.
The lack of clarity arises because the regulation of social media does not distinguish between an interpersonal communication – like a letter, phone call or email – and a communication to an exponential mass audience which equates with a broadcast.
Should companies be responsible for the consequences of their exponential ‘retweet’ buttons, or for protecting ‘followers’? Paradoxically, the social media companies seem to think so, not because they might be breaking the law, but because they might lose customers. Unlike democratic governments, social media companies can respond very quickly to their ‘constituents’. Facebook has population of 2.8 billion people worldwide, more than any national electorate. China has a mere 1.4 billion.
Unsurprisingly, the small progressive democracies in the Baltic region are ahead. In 2017, Estonia was ‘leading the renewal of EU media services regulation’. The Audiovisual Media Services Directive was extended to cover new media if they promote violence or hatred. In 2021, just two weeks after the Brexit divorce, these new EU principles were quietly incorporated into UK law, without a tweet of complaint.
So, are the social media companies a new and more representative, aspect of democracy? In a book about Leadership Accountability (2006), as e-activism was becoming more nimble than national politics, I discussed ‘Direct Democratic Accountability’ and suggested that there might be ‘a mass realization that democracy, in the form of voting, is not the paramount mechanism for political accountability in a globalizing world. It is just one of a range of many options, which happened to be modestly effective in certain regional contexts at particular periods of history.’
In 2005 British Sociologist Anthony Giddens considered ‘continuous direct democracy’, and Lord Howell predicted, ‘Voters want service and ongoing accountability, not dictation and top-down arrogance. And if they cannot get it they will employ ways other than through voting and party politics to satisfy their needs.’
Let’s hope that small flexible countries like Estonia (and New Zealand) can discover ways forward. Alternatives are uncomfortable. Following the 2015 Charlie Hebdow killings in Paris, young Muslim protesters used the liberal traditions of Speakers’ Corner in London’s Hyde Park to express their views. Seemingly immune to cognitive dissonance or irony they held a banner, ‘TO HELL WITH FREEDOM OF SPEECH’.
by Tanya Ogilvie-White | Jan 8, 2021 | International Advisory Panel
I’ve spent my life studying the risks posed by nuclear weapons. I’ve always worried that one day an unhinged leader would emerge in a nuclear-armed country, with the authority to launch a nuclear attack. To me, the assumption that nuclear-armed leaders will act rationally has always seemed fundamentally flawed and dangerous. Robert McNamara, former US secretary of defence, highlighted this problem when he warned ‘the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations’. Today, I worry about this more than ever and wish more people would wake up to the problem and push for change.
Until Donald Trump was elected president, I never considered the United States would feature so prominently in my assessments of nuclear risk. Granted, the US has a patchy record of nuclear decision-making (including accidents and close calls), but in terms of relative nuclear risk, other nuclear-armed states have tended to raise more red flags. Over the past few years, however, I’ve watched President Trump’s behaviour with growing alarm, with an eye on the potential domestic and global consequences of his unchecked narcissism.
His presidency has been disturbing for so many reasons: his irresponsible approach to the pandemic; his encouragement of racism, extremism, sexism, and corruption; his flagrant incitement of political violence; his fuelling of conspiracy theories and blatant disregard for the truth…I could go on. Perhaps most disturbing, though, is his enablement by those who would normally be expected to check irrational and irresponsible behaviour – and this despite their knowledge that Trump has had sole authority in the US to launch nuclear weapons.
Even putting Trump’s erratic behaviour aside, it’s incredible to me that the ‘sole authority’ nuclear decision-making procedure, which is a relic of the Cold War, still exists in the United States. It was introduced to allow the president to employ nuclear weapons within minutes of receiving warning of an attack, without needing to consult others. Decades later, this procedure remains in place, with US nuclear forces kept ready for prompt launch, and with no statute limiting the president’s nuclear authority. To drive this point home, this means the US president can order a nuclear attack without briefing Congress and without even informing the Executive Branch, including the secretary of defense, secretary of state, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, commander of the US strategic command, or the attorney general. Ultimately, the decision to use US nuclear weapons is the president’s and the president’s alone.
When the sole authority procedure was introduced, the idea of a rogue US president assuming office and recklessly abusing his presidential authority would have seemed like a ‘black swan’ (unexpected and fanciful) event or even science fiction. But such confidence has sometimes waned (as it did during the Watergate Scandal when President Nixon’s advisors doubted his sanity and tried to limit his nuclear authority), and it would be fair to say that during the Trump presidency it has slumped to an all-time low. Among his many awful lessons, Trump has taught us that nothing can be taken for granted: the unexpected does happen; political leaders do behave irrationally; and the reckless actions of unhinged leaders can and do go unchecked, including in democracies once held up as beacons to the world.
All of this has profound implications for global security. I’m not arguing that the world is facing an imminent nuclear threat from the United States; my point is that we need to wake up from the type of nuclear complacency that has allowed Cold War relics to remain a key feature of our rapidly changing world. Today, it’s more important than ever that political decisions reflect our shared responsibility to maintain strategic stability, and that threats to that stability are dealt with with the future of humanity and the planet in mind.
The upcoming entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 22 January is a timely and important step on our long-term path towards nuclear disarmament, but it will have little impact on current nuclear risks, including those posed by unhinged leaders. More significant would be a decision by the incoming administration of President-elect, Joe Biden to introduce statutory limits on the president’s launch authority. Given Trump’s abuse of power, it’s critical that the new administration takes this step. If it does, the media interest it would generate would provide an opportunity for interested parties to draw unprecedented global attention to the issue of nuclear risk reduction, including providing a powerful platform to promote the shared security benefits of reducing the alert status of nuclear weapons and pledging not to be the first to use them. It could also encourage the nuclear-armed states and their allies to reassess the logic and ethics of nuclear deterrence in our unpredictable world.
A final word on the Trump presidency and the situation unfolding in Washington, DC: if even the US leadership can’t be relied upon to prevent a descent into riotous chaos, surely it adds weight to the argument that the risks from the continued existence of nuclear weapons are just too great for us not to ban and eliminate them.
