by Pooran Pandey | Dec 17, 2020 | Guests
The US presidential election has now concluded with the Electoral College confirming Joe Biden and Kamala Harris as the winners (by 306 to 232 votes). It remains for Congress to certify the Electoral College votes on 6 January, before the Inauguration on the 20th.
The 2020 election was held under unprecedented circumstances – marred by racial protest, street violence, political dispute from the outgoing incumbent, and deep cultural divisive within the country.
So what to make of this bastion of democracy, in 2021? What are the implications for us all – proceeding by scale, from the national, to the regional, international, and global?
National: India
Let me begin with a focus on my own country. A positive India-US bilateral relationship has enjoyed bipartisan support in both countries over the years. The relationship has seen a steady ascent in both scope and form, especially during the Obama years. This increasingly has regional implications – policy analysts judge that a future India-US relationship must not be seen in isolation from Asia at large.
India is increasingly seen as a significant counter-balance to China, within Asia and even beyond. This is reinforced with the existence of the QUAD – a group of democratic nations (US, Japan, Australia, India) aligning together for a ‘safe, secure, and open Indo-Pacific region’. The cooperation includes joint military exercises in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and various security pacts concluded. The QUAD has had a discernible impact on how Europe is crafting its own rules of engagement in the Indo-Pacific region, and with India.
The Indian-American community, along with the South Asian-American community more generally, has played a key role in recent US elections, in respect of both influence and voting pattern. They are likely, as a result, to attract more attention within the US, including in the foreign policy agenda. It is significant that incoming Vice-President Kamala Harris has strong Indian roots; and the President-elect also has a genealogy connected to India.
India and the US have, in fact, recently moved closer across the spectrum of the bilateral relationship, from security to technology, to cooperation on terrorism, and reform of the multilateral system.
It is likely that future bilateral relations will largely be seen through the lens of regional security, territorial disputes, sovereignty frictions, infrastructure connectivity projects, and transparency and governance in development cooperation. The US may adopt a more flexible foreign policy in Asia, strengthening its bilateral cooperation with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives and Sri Lanka.
It is, moreover, almost certain that the US presence in Asia will be further consolidated, and will substantively hinge on the regional security situation, having regard to more assertive diplomacy by some major regional powers in quest of a more dominant role.
Regional: Asia
Asia is home to over half of the global population. Besides being also one of the largest markets in the global economy, it is one of the world’s security hotspots. It is therefore likely to remain a key priority area for the US. The region also gains salience with all major powers in view of the recent recurring geo-political and trade disputes, characterized by:
- the new security law in Hong Kong;
- territorial contestation in Taiwan;
- the militarized border stand-off between India and China in the Himalayas;
- 5G technology and its competitive dimension;
- infrastructure connectivity projects;
- bad debt issues stemming from opaque and shady development cooperation; and
- the health pandemic.
All these challenges will continue to be contested issues where coalitions and partnerships in the region will be scaled up, with a greater involvement of the US and other new allies and partners.
Yet Asia also seems to be on the cusp of a turning-point where contestation over territorial and trade disputes, among others, may intensify in the near future. Concern over the recent handling of Covid-19, its spread and origin, associated supply-chain blockade issues, and a lack of transparency in reporting the pandemic will also likely spike, impacting relations adversely.
The China-US relationship over recent years will be fashioned by the intended scale of US involvement in the region. Smaller neighbors such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar are also likely to play a complementary role in the shaping of US policy towards Asia.
Japan and South Korea, as key US allies, are likely to receive favorable attention. These will probably be centered on trade, technology and security issues. The change of leadership in Japan is unlikely to see any perceptible change in the continuing foreign policy approaches of the US towards their long standing allies.
North Korea, however, is likely be receive greater attention as it presents a new security threat to both the region and the US, given its aspiration to develop nuclear-armed ICBMs that can reach the Americas. Such a threat is further complicated by the secrecy around the domestic situation in the DPRK, including hostility with some of its neighbors. US policy on North Korea may substantively change – perhaps a termination in diplomatic negotiations, imposition of trade sanctions and economic blockade with verifiable monitoring mechanisms. Nations supporting the North Korean regime may also face surveillance, monitoring and sanctions.
Broadly, US intervention in Asia is likely to expand because of the region’s diversity and complexity. No doubt each major power will contend that its foreign policy reflects an aspiration for a strengthened rules-based regime in the region, directly proportional to the need for regional safety, security, and well-being. The challenge for analysts of global affairs will be to gauge how much is nationally subjective, and how much is objectively cast in the common interest as called for in the UN Charter.
International: The UN and other institutions
The US is generally seen as a globalist, and a leader in setting geo-economic, political, trade and a rules-based order for international peace, progress and increasing prosperity of all nations – and ‘We the Peoples’ through that.
Much of the global agenda is undertaken through multilateral institutions including the United Nations and its related agencies. But as one of the oldest national democracies, the US has played a significant role, not only as the lead architect of the institutions themselves but as a major contributor to their financing, governance and agenda-setting.
The past four years have witnessed a sharp drift away from this philosophy, with the Trump Administration withdrawing from, among others, the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization. This has led to an overall weakening of the multilateral system, exacerbating existing problems of funding shortfalls, indecisive leadership, poor collaboration and inadequate governance.
With the new US Administration already committing to rejoining the Paris climate accord and the WHO, with restored funding and new technical expertise, it is likely that the traditional US leadership will be reaffirmed. Restoring the WTO through the appointment of arbitrators is also on the agenda.
Developmental goals – whether they address health or climate issues – are usually less likely to be achieved in the absence of collective action. President-elect Biden, during the election campaign, had made his intent clear to supporting multilateral institutions with financial support and more technical expertise, including reforming their governance structures to make them a better fit to serve humanity.
These initial commitments of the incoming Administration relate, in effect, to a wider undertaking to reform the United Nations itself as the world body struggles to retain relevance in a changing world. One of the key reforms awaiting the UN is expansion of the Security Council. It is widely anticipated that the US will now move ahead with more speed and intent with UN reform. Improved governance will make the world body a truly representative platform – a long overdue expectation on the part of the comity of nations.
Global: “We the Peoples….”
People in today’s world are ever more closely connected by modern technology, and therefore more economically, socially and politically interdependent. This calls for a more equal world without discrimination, and with fairer economic opportunity, more respect for human rights, freedom of assembly and speech. These goals can only be assured through stronger domestic and international law, in accordance with the principles of diversity and proportionality.
Notable among these goals is also data privacy, and its protection against IT misuse and theft. This can be done in a number of ways, including legal instruments and ‘coalitions of the willing’ to ensure a fair and transparent system that applies equitably to users of modern telecommunications. This is important for human rights and personal liberty, but also to inspire confidence of the global community of peoples in domestic and international legal instruments. On this issue at least – the goal of a robust national, regional and global consensus for protection of peoples’ rights – there is probably a bipartisan consensus within the US.
Looking Ahead
The influence of US policy in India and Asia in general seems unlikely to change with the new US Administration. Senior diplomats in New Delhi and Washington are closely engaged in their deliberations over a new roadmap for enhanced bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the future, given the new US Administration is seized with the importance of the relationship between the world’s two oldest and largest democracies.
It seems a sheer coincidence that the new US Administration and India’s two-year term as a new non-permanent member of the UN Security Council begin simultaneously, in January ‘21. The two democracies should begin to work together in this ‘high council’ of multilateralism. Adoption of bilateral and multilateral approaches between India and US can only help build greater confidence of comity among the nations and among the peoples – in democracy, the rule of law, and in a fair and transparent dispensation and delivery of justice.
by Abbas Nazari | Dec 9, 2020 | Young Global Scholars Group
How is the emerging global community to deal with alleged war crimes, within the context of contemporary international law and national political integrity? This is one of the more critical questions of the early 21st century.
War crimes are many, and varied – and comprised, by definition, of atrocity. Yet dealing with them is not the easiest challenge to national political leadership. How are we doing, this year – 2020 in the Year of Our Lord?
Australian crisis
In mid-November, Australia’s Defence Force released a summary report of the findings of a four-year investigation into alleged war crimes committed by its SAS in Afghanistan. The report uncovered evidence of the extra-judicial killing of at least 39 Afghan civilians, and the torture of two others.
Central to the alleged killings is the practice of ‘blooding’ – whereby young soldiers were encouraged to execute prisoners to get their ‘first kill’. Many prisoners were handcuffed or unarmed. In one instance, an Afghan villager, Haji Sardar, was dragged away and beaten to death, even though an SAS medic was treating him, clearly presenting no threat to the soldiers.
The report revealed that in some instances, SAS soldiers planted ‘throw-downs’ – evidence placed near the body such as a firearm or a radio receiver – to ‘conceal deliberate unlawful killings’. The report makes it clear that these were unlawful and unjustified killings and has recommended criminal investigations into the conduct of at least 19 soldiers.
Against such allegations, defendants may claim that the killings were a result of operating in the ‘fog of war’ – a term used to describe the chaos and sensory overload during a gun battle. But the report paints a picture of criminal conduct far outside the heat of battle and in direct violation of the rules of engagement as enshrined in the Geneva Conventions.
Soldiers in elite fighting units volunteer for the role, and the code of ethics is drilled into them as much as target practice. Killing unarmed civilians and placing evidence to frame the victim as a threat is not due to the ‘fog of war’. The soldiers would have known what they were doing.
Dusty Miller, the SAS medic tending to Sardar before he was dragged away, was one of the first whistleblowers. Miller’s determination to speak up in such a charged environment must be applauded. Every team member in any organization, regardless of the environment in which they operate, should be able to speak out against wrongdoing. Although it is early, it is heartening to see the ADF and the Australian government commit to a criminal investigation, compensation for the families of victims, the dismissal of at least a dozen soldiers, and the disbanding the SAS units involved.
The report coincides with the 75th anniversary of the Nuremburg trials, which heralded the beginning of legal accountability for war crimes. The Nuremburg trials were monumental, in setting international norms regarding conflict – essentially the rules which UN member states must uphold during conflict. Leaving aside, for the moment, the political-legal arguments of Australia’s significant commitment to the US-led ‘war on terror’, if the ADF is to rebuild its tarnished reputation, it must revitalize a deeper respect for the laws of war.
New Zealand self-admonition
In fact, Afghanistan, along with Iraq in particular, is proving to be a moment of truth for Western states. Following allegations in the 2017 book Hit and Run: the New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan and the meaning of honour, there was widespread concern that the NZ-SAS, attacking a village in pursuit of Taliban fighters in 2010, had killed and injured civilians. In 2018 the NZ Govt. established a formal inquiry into the allegations.
The official description of the ‘Inquiry into Operation Burnham’ was more nuanced than the Australian report:
The Inquiry has sought to establish the facts in connection with the allegations, examine the treatment by NZDF of reports of civilian casualties following the operation, and assess the conduct of NZDF forces. In common with all inquiries established under the Inquiries Act 2013, this Inquiry has no power to determine the civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability of any person, or award reparations. However it may, if justified, make findings of fault and recommend further steps be taken to determine liability.
The ensuing Burnham Report (July 2020) concluded that, because of a ‘disappointing lack of commitment and rigour on the part of senior NZDF personnel’, cabinet ministers had not been able to exercise the democratic control of the military. The report found that the SAS soldiers were not directly responsible for any wrongful civilian deaths, and that they acted professionally during the raid.
It was ‘likely’, however, that a female child had been killed during the operation. The report considered that the way a prisoner had been treated and handled showed that New Zealand’s detention policy had been inappropriate and not reflective of NZ values. One captured insurgent had been handed over to Afghan authorities based on the knowledge that he was likely to be tortured.[i] And the then Defence Minister had ‘forgotten’ a crucial briefing from a senior defence official and had consequently misled Parliament and the public.
To be clear, the allegations advanced against the NZ-SAS and NZDF are not at the same level as its Australian counterpart, but the Report’s findings and recommendations are still sobering. The Prime Minister has stated that:
“I think the recommendations that have been made here will only strengthen some of the practices and some of the lines of communication between Government and the Defence Force and give that extra confidence. That is something that we are taking very seriously and that we think will add that extra layer of confidence both for the Government and for New Zealanders.”[ii]
New Zealand, in fact, is awash in self-admonitory reviews and enquiries, none of which appears to conclude that legal liability is at stake for those potentially responsible. Consider the inquiry in to the Christchurch mosque attacks.
The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques has just released its report (Dec 2020). Its conclusions will, to put it subtly, require considerable nuanced reflection. It essentially says that, in the circumstances prevailing in 2019 in the country, nothing occurred in terms of the terrorist’s behaviour that should have alerted the NZ security intelligence authorities to an impending attack, viz: “Given the operational security that the individual maintained, the legislative authorising environment in which the counter-terrorism effort operates and the limited capability and capacity of the counter-terrorism agencies, there was no plausible way he could have been detected except by chance.”
This, notwithstanding that the terrorist had purchased firearms and joined a shooting club upon arriving in New Zealand, reported to a doctor for excessive steroid and testosterone use, reported to medical emergency for accidentally shooting himself in the eye and leg, posted extreme right-wing views on social media, and had a checked travel history including North Korea, and the sites of medieval battles between Crusaders and Muslims. None of the relevant authorities related to this behaviour judged it fit to report his action to the police.
The conclusion appears to be that no official individual or agency was at fault, yet ‘the system’ let the country down. The Report contains 44 recommendations, all of which the government has given an ‘in-principle’ commitment. The PM, the Director of the SIS, and the Police Commissioner have apologised for a lax firearms licensing regime, and for a slanted approach to terrorist risks in New Zealand by the official agencies.
British and American sidesteps
Sadly, respect for the laws of war is in decline globally. None of the soldiers involved in the torture and murders of detainees at the US military-run prison of Abu Ghraib received serious punishment. Last month, the US placed sanctions on members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who are investigating possible war crimes committed by US special forces in Afghanistan. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has called for other countries to commit similar inquiries into the conduct of their troops, notably the allegations of unlawful killings by British special forces.
While the criminal proceedings will ultimately focus on the alleged crimes, they are a symptom of a much broader issue. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the political rhetoric, media coverage, civil discourse, and the entertainment industry has dehumanized the very people who struggle under the oppressive cloud of terrorism.
The 2011 operation into the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US Navy SEALs was the subject of the multimillion-dollar blockbuster, Zero Dark Thirty. Yet, it left out of the script the litany of horrific crimes committed by the SEALs, such as the scalping of prisoners using hatchets, the mutilation of bodies, and the wanton killing of innocent civilians, including children. The soldiers were engaged in a ‘blood sport’, dehumanizing the person on the other end of the gun barrel, and unleashing a reign of terror for the very people they were meant to protect and liberate.
The civilian plight of modern global conflict
Criminal activity by Western states plus the atrocities committed by international terrorists are symptomatic of a modern global malaise. We are becoming desensitized to violence. There have been more than 100,000 civilian deaths in Afghanistan in the last decade. To put that into perspective, it is the equivalent death toll of the Christchurch terror attacks occurring every single day for more than five years.
Leaving investigative action for alleged crimes by a nation-state to the nation-state unavoidably raises suspicions of subjectivity, no matter how rigorous a system may be in times of normalcy. That is the rationale for the ICC as a ‘court of second instance’. It is a deep irony that many countries refuse to refer matters to the ICC or actively oppose it. The Court is presently struggling, but its rationale is timeless.
The dehumanizing of the victims of war needs to stop at the societal and political level, so it does not reach the battlefield. This will require a new kind of leadership among all member states of the United Nations, without exception.
[i] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/31/new-zealand-military-misled-ministers-about-civilians-deaths-in-afghanistan-raid-report-finds
[ii] https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2020/07/jacinda-ardern-recognises-major-failings-in-defence-force-over-operation-burnham-findings.html
by Alex Kazaglis | Nov 19, 2020 | International Advisory Panel
At first glance the decision to delay the largest climate conference in history – COP 26 (1) – appears to have been made on practical grounds. COVID-19 had made convening 30,000 delegates from 197 countries impossible. For the conference, it is also true that its UK hosts were simply not ready. Although the UK Government is well accustomed to dealing with many issues at once, 2020 was different. A uniquely difficult year, including Brexit, has seen institutional capacity at times overwhelmed. (more…)
by Tapio Kanninen | Oct 25, 2020 | International Advisory Panel
Back in May, Georgios Kostakos and I published two columns on the global and national responses to Covid-19, and its implications for global governance. The biggest impact, we said, will be determined by the responses of China and the US.
In this column, I analyse the United States itself – in the midst of both the pandemic and elections. What global implications might these developments have?
My conclusion: while the US has been the leader of the world order created after WWII, its leadership role is now deteriorating. But there are positive and well as negative scenarios.
US exceptionalism: some worrisome trends
- Failure of the US pandemic response
The fact that the US has been the worst in the world in dealing with the pandemic is surprising and indicating a possible gradual decline of the US’s role in the international system. Five reasons for the US failures:
- Political leadership has sent conflicting messages and has been unable to create a national plan for testing, supplying protective equipment and how the states could consistently follow CDC guidelines. President Trump challenges and disagrees with his own scientific epidemiologists, does not mask up at his rallies, failing to show an example to America in general, and does not condemn the fact that his supporters are neither social distancing nor wearing masks in his own rallies. The fact that he contracted the virus himself with several top officials in the White House is a striking demonstration of failed leadership.
- The US is decentralized in terms of decisions on mask mandates, lockdowns and enforcing guarantees. State governors rule; they can overturn the intentions of local mayors who want to apply more stringently the CDC guidelines on lockdowns, mask-use, permitted gatherings and school openings. The political divisiveness inside states and between the blue and red states creates confusion and social disharmony, leading potentially to violence and instability.
- The US has for decades downplayed the role of public health services and agencies. This has meant that the preparedness of public health agencies at the federal, state and local levels was in imperfect shape when the pandemic hit. With no federal funding, the situation is just getting worse.
- The protection of ‘American individualism’ has become a central issue in terms of masks and lockdowns. Certain right-wing segments of the media, but also Attorney General Barr, see lockdowns and mask mandates as violating basic rights of Americans to choose their destiny, warning of attempts by the opposition to pave the way for socialism and ‘dictatorship of big government’.
- The emergence of super-emotional commentary, and vitriolic hate speech at its worst, as well as conspiracy allegations between Democrats and Republicans and between the news media and social media supporting each side, with President Trump strongly encouraging such divisiveness, is a new feature of contemporary US politics. This thwarts a unified national strategy to combat the Covid-19 threat based on joint values and narratives.
- Pandemic’s contribution to US political instability
Covid-19 has also intensified other new trends in American politics and culture.
The racial divide has become a renewed focus of the American political discussion after a number of cases of police brutality. This divide is used by both right-wing and left-wing extremists to create violence and instability. Law and order has become a new campaign issue. Both the protests and counter-protests, mostly without masks and no social distancing intensify the spread of the virus and create more divisiveness and allegations of hypocrisy and lawlessness behavior by both sides.
Prof Lawrence Douglas’ book “Will He Go? Trump and Looming Election Meltdown in 2020″ and Barton Gellman’s 23 September on-line article in The Atlantic ”The Election that Could Break America” – among other similar accounts – have revealed the so far hidden truth that the US Constitution does not provide a path for a peaceful succession in case a sitting president campaigning for a second term does not want to leave the office whether or not he wins or loses the elections.
The US Constitution assumes that a loser of the presidential election is willing to concede the electoral loss. But it has no clear provisions when the loser is unwilling to make such a concession. Barton Gellman offers evidence that Trump will never concede and his strategy is to delegitimize the elections as Biden’s win has seemed likely already months before elections. Covid-19 is a contributing to this dangerous situation.
- Nightmare scenario: Imperfect constitutional provisions for succession
The nightmare scenario would be the outcome of two basic factors.
- First the Democrats vote usually overwhelmingly more often by mail than Republicans and now, because of Covid-19, they are expected to vote many times more by mail than in earlier elections. Polls have found that Republicans are much less worried about the pandemic and might mostly vote in person in polling places like in earlier elections.
- Secondly, President Trump and his supporters see these facts an an opening for delegitimizing elections because of mail voting – in case Biden is on the path to victory – and actively discouraging mail-in voting in key states as well (e.g. the Republican Governor of Texas decreed that there should be only one drop-in mail box site in each county of the state meaning in some cases one box site for millions of residents).
This nightmare scenario might not be realized if Biden is able to win by a landslide on Election Day. But it is important to consider this scenario as it reveals the vulnerability of the US constitution in case of a future ruthless president seeking a re-election or any future populist presidential candidate understanding the constitutional loopholes and using them to his or her advantage.
In Gellman’s nightmare scenario, Donal Trump leads on Election Day while Biden wins after all voting is counted. Trump’s strategy is to declare him a winner on 3rd of November and to seek both the courts, including the Supreme Court, and the assistance of Trump’s sympathetic Republican legislators and governors in swing states to stop any further vote-counting.
So far this kind of situation has not happened in the US for some 150 years. But in 1876, in key swing states at that time the situation was similar as now in swing states of Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan. The legislature was Republican, but the governors were Democrats. In 1876 the Republican legislatures certified a Republican candidate (Rutherford Hayes) as a winner but Democratic governors a Democratic candidate (Samuel Tilden) as a winner. When the Congress met in early January to declare a new president there were two contradicting results from key swing states. This can happen in a worst case scenario on January 6th, 2021, as well.
In January 1877 the leaders of the Congress (and others who were involved) were able to negotiate a winner (Hayes) but the process was difficult. Two days before Inauguration, the sitting president, Ulysses Grant, was so concerned that he considered declaring martial law and naming fellow Republican Hayes as the winner. In 2021, Trump may welcome this kind of scenario. His friend and fixer, Richard Stone, has already suggested to Trump the use of martial law for his benefit.
Prof Bruce Ackerman, in a Slate article, refers to a related scenario. The declaration of the winner is supposed to happen in a joint session of the Congress on 6 January 2021. Ackerman continues:
“Mike Pence, as president of the Senate, will chair the joint session of Congress that decides who won the election. Before the session begins, Trump announces that Pence will disqualify close Biden victories as plainly fraudulent, while upholding close Republican victories as entirely legitimate—making it mathematically impossible for Congress to select Biden. The president’s lawyers claim that precedents from the founding era authoritatively establish Pence’s unilateral authority on such matters. To counter this threat, Nancy Pelosi refuses to allow the joint session to take place and asserts that the plain language of the President Succession Act makes her, as speaker, ‘acting president’ on Jan. 20. This conflict on Capitol Hill provokes an escalating wave of street protests across America, and violent police measures, as Inauguration Day approaches.”
If the above scenarios prove to be true then either the Congressional leaders (with covert assistance from generals, state governors and others) will reach compromise before Inauguration Day, or they just cannot. Then, if Trump declares martial law, and himself as President for more four years, the US will become an ‘unstable democracy’.
This is not such a far-fetched scenario as it might look in the first instance as some see already a possibility of civil war situations when we approach late 2020 and thereafter. One such scenario was studied in summer 2020 in four days of simulations of Transition Integrity Project modelling the election and its aftermath in an affect to find out the worst case scenarios. Gellman describes one such worst-case scenario as follows:
“John Podesta, Hillary Clinton’s campaign chair in 2016 led a Biden team in another scenario that was prepared to follow Trump to the edge of civil war, encouraging three blue states threatening a secession.”
The strongly ingrained attitudes and ideological rigidity of both Democrats and Republicans regarding the Trump victory has just intensified recently auguring badly for the election aftermath. Hillary Clinton jumped the bandwagon saying: “Joe Biden should not concede under any circumstances.”
Implications for the global community: A question of values
The pandemic has hit the world hard – increasing poverty, inequality and economic and social hardships everywhere. Its impact on environment and climate change is not yet clear. But its impact on our values is maybe the strongest.
The US has been a champion of the stable and globalized liberal world order with free trade and support for international organizations and coalitions. But since Trump’s election we have seen a clear erosion of US leadership in these areas. The US has also been a champion of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the world but Trump has shown little interest in following US presidential tradition.
The US reputation in the world was already hit hard by its poor initial Covid-19 response. Any election instability will further erode its potential leadership role particularly in furthering democratic values and setting an example to new or restored democracies that are struggling to maintain such principles and practices amidst the pandemic and deepening economic and social calamities.
Worse, US electoral instability might inspire a new wave of ruthless leaders to resort blindly to national interests and ‘survival of the fittest’ away from globalism and internationalism as strong global values that grew out from the tragic experiences of the WWII, and the idealism of the victorious states. Populist leaders, and of course dictators, can use the vulnerabilities in democratic constitutions and practices, and sudden openings for power crab created by Covid-19, for their own political benefits.
But perhaps the most dangerous trend inspired by the current US politics is the effort at undermining the value of truth. Honesty and integrity are under attack by populists, dictators and conspiracy theorists who want to create a strong feeling of divide between ‘us and them’ – the ‘evil’ and the ‘patriotic’. Strong emotions dominate when ‘fake news’ is a new political slogan and truth is losing its impact as a uniting force in national and global politics. The culture of ‘lying without shame’ might become the new normal. Prof Joseph Nye calls this trend a ‘1930-like authoritarian challenge’.
The international governance system is also under attack and might see major changes. Trump’s isolationist strategy will probably continue whether Trump or Biden is the next US president, albeit less so with Biden. But Biden as a new president might face so wide street violence and instability by Trump supporters that he might not have the luxury to devote much time to international affairs as he is trying to save the US from civil war like conditions.
As a consequence, both China and Europe are likely to become more influential players on the world scene. Because of Covid and the election instability, US leadership and exceptionalism in the world is bound to decrease. China’s growing role might be inevitable. That might not bode well for global democratic values and transparency in global governance. The EU, however, might offer a balancing counterpoint.
The above trends are mostly negative currents in the world governance system of today. But not all possible future trends are negative. Joseph Nye saw a possibility for a greener planetary future. Public opinion in many democracies is beginning to place a higher priority on climate change and environmental conservation. Some governments and companies are re-organizing to deal with such issues. Even before Covid-19, one could foresee an international agenda in 2030 defined by each country’s focus on green issues. By highlighting the links between human and planetary health, the pandemic accelerates adoption of this agenda.
Trump’s re-election might not further greener global trends but it might not stop them either. Biden’s win might accelerate the international focus to stop global warming as an existential threat to all of us.
The future will show if the goal of a sustainable planet will unite us all amidst the aftermath of the pandemic. Such a new unifying global value is, in fact, badly needed.
by Ramesh Thakur | Oct 1, 2020 | Board
During the Cold War, the nuclear landscape was dominated by the globe-spanning US–Soviet bipolar rivalry. Russia and the United States still account for over 90% of the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons.
The emerging strategic rivalry, however, is between the US as the weakening hegemon and China as the rising comprehensive national power.
This is why Washington decided it could no longer ignore the nuclear challenge to its interests in the vast Indo–Pacific maritime space posed by China’s absence from the missile prohibitions of the INF treaty. About 95% of China’s missiles are in the INF range, enabling it to target forward-deployed US forces and allied territory – including Japan, Guam and Australia, with relatively inexpensive precision-strike conventional capability.
Without INF restrictions, the US can develop and station ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missiles in Guam, Japan, South Korea, and northern Australia that could reach deep into China’s interior. However, the search for Pacific allies prepared to host intermediate range conventional US missiles aimed at China will be challenging, with the downsides in bilateral relations with China and domestic political opposition likely to outweigh potential military advantages.
Speaking after the INF’s demise in August last year, the US President said he wanted Beijing to be party to any new nuclear pact with Moscow. China has rejected requests to save the INF by trilateralising it. Its stockpile of 320 nuclear warheads is not comparable to 6,375 Russian and 5,800 U.S. warheads.
On Aug. 6, 2019, Disarmament Ambassador Li Song expressed China’s deep regret and opposition to the ‘irresponsible unilateral’ U.S. withdrawal from the INF. On the same day Fu Cong, director of arms control in China’s Foreign Ministry, cautioned Asia-Pacific countries against permitting INF-range missiles to be deployed on their territory.
In an agenda-resetting speech in October 2018, the US Vice President outlined a thick catalogue of predatory practices and aggressive behaviour across a broad front by China. The Secretary of State updated the Administration’s strategic approach to China in a speech on July 23, depicting China as an ‘existential threat’ and calling for ‘a new alliance of democracies’. Where then-President Reagan had based his arms control dealings with the Soviet Union on the bon mot ‘trust but verify’, Pompeo said that, with China’s communist regime, ‘we must distrust and verify’.
At a news conference on Jan. 22, Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang bluntly rejected US calls for trilateral arms control talks: “The US constantly makes an issue of China on this to dodge and shift its responsibilities for nuclear disarmament.” Beijing has concluded that the US President does not believe in arms control, and is scapegoating China to pursue his real goal of dissolving the existing US–Russia nuclear arms control regime in order for his country to compete more effectively with China. Nuclear analyst Tong Zhao explains: “China views the U.S. push for trilateral arms control as purely insincere, hypocritical, and hostile against China.” Beijing is also suspicious of arms control as a tool for the strong, to undermine the security of the weak.
Washington has remained persistent. In May the new presidential senior envoy on arms control, Marshall Billingslea, expressed interest in a new far-reaching accord to limit all Chinese, Russian, and US nuclear warheads, including those on short-range delivery systems and those kept in storage. This would replace New START, but would also require very intrusive verification measures to cover stockpiles.
It will be challenging either to persuade China to accept significantly lower numbers of warheads than Russia and the US or, alternatively, persuade Moscow and Washington to permit China to reach parity.
A third way doesn’t exist. Fu Cong said: “if the U.S. says that they are ready to come down to the Chinese level, China will be happy to participate the next day.” However, “we know that’s not going to happen.”
Especially when Beijing perceives US policy as being increasingly aggressive and aimed at containing China, nuclear forces are seen as the ultimate guarantor of national security. To the Chinese, US refusal to acknowledge mutual vulnerability, and efforts to enhance damage-limitation and long-range precision strike capabilities, signal a higher nuclear risk threshold.
This is an updated version of the classic ‘security dilemma’ where one side’s defence-cum-deterrence preparedness to bolster national security is perceived by the other side as strengthened offensive capability and hence a threat to its security. This is why China has warned against the development and deployment of missile defence systems that could trigger a ‘high-tech arms race’ which aggravates ‘the international strategic imbalance’.
Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the militantly nationalistic Global Times, argues that “China needs to expand the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,000 in a relatively short time and procure at least 100 DF-41 strategic missiles.” But Zhao responded: “If China were to significantly build up its nuclear arsenal, it would seriously damage its international image and potentially threaten the efficacy and stability of the international non-proliferation regime.” This would undermine China’s “own interest in maintaining regional and international stability.” He notes that China successfully safeguarded its national security against far superior numbers of US and Soviet nuclear warheads during the Cold War.
China’s current nuclear technological prowess is comparable to Russia and the US, and it has hugely better survivability and counter-attack capabilities compared to its assets during the Cold War. Zhao’s warning that “a major expansion of nuclear weapons may bring more fear than respect” deserves to be taken to heart by all nuclear-armed states.
China’s stockpile has remained stable over decades, despite fluctuations in Russian and US numbers because Beijing doesn’t believe nuclear weapons can be used militarily to fight a war. Rather, they are political weapons to deter nuclear attack and prevent nuclear blackmail.
This permits China to adopt asymmetric deterrence postures vis‑a‑vis the US with significantly lower stockpiles. Instead of engaging in a sprint to parity that would fuel the nuclear arms race, China relies on buttressing the survivability and penetrability of its nuclear forces. For example greater maneuverability of the DF-21D missiles makes it difficult for enemy weapons to intercept them, while enhancing the precision of their munitions makes it easier to target moving enemy vessels with them.
Multilateral nuclear arms control agreements will have to accommodate the asymmetries in numbers and types of warheads and missiles, doctrines and force postures as they affect the relative military balance of the countries concerned.
by Jayden van Leeuwen | Sep 25, 2020 | Board
There is no denying that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact across the globe, causing sickness, death, economic downturn and invariable other forms of suffering as the virus has spread internationally.
At present in late-September, we approach the eye-watering total of 31.5 million cases, and the saddening total of 1 million deaths[1] – and those are merely the figures of which we’re aware.
For all the successes and failings that we have seen since COVID-19 first emerged, it is critical that the global community, international organisations and individual states learn from the past 10 months to develop policies, processes, structures and institutions to manage future health emergencies as effectively and efficiently as possible.
This was not lost on the World Health Assembly when it met in May 2020, and passed a resolution calling for the WHO Director-General to:[2]
…initiate, at the earliest appropriate moment, and in consultation with Member States, a stepwise process of impartial, independent and comprehensive evaluation, including using existing mechanisms, as appropriate, to review experience gained and lessons learned from the WHO–coordinated international health response to COVID-19…
Given that between May and September the pandemic has been accelerating in many ways, one might be forgiven for assuming that a review of actions taken, opportunities missed, and areas for improvement would still be a long way off. But in early July, the Director-General announced the establishment of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (IPPR).
Headed by two respected international figures, former NZ Prime Minister Helen Clark and former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the IPPR is tasked with reviewing and evaluating the international response to COVID-19. Its mission is to provide a ‘comprehensive evidence-based assessment of the COVID-19 response as well as lessons for the future’. The Panel is fully impartial and independent.
That impartiality and independence will be crucial to the credibility of the IPPR and its report. The Director-General has, no doubt, sought to boost that credibility through his appointment of two well-respected and experienced international civil servants as Co-Chairs, and providing them with wide autonomy, including to appoint the other members of the Panel, and the dedicated secretariat who will support its operations.
This independence is also reinforced in the IPPR’s Terms of Reference, hopefully providing a strong foundation for the review.[3] Given the criticism that the WHO has faced (notably from the USA which formally announced on 7 July that it will withdraw from WHO, effective 6 July 2021) for the its role in the international response to the pandemic, the IPPR and the report it is set to produce will be crucial.
The remaining IPPR members, announced on 3 September, represent a diversity of experience, perspective, nationality and expertise. They include a former Minister of Finance, former President of Médecins Sans Frontières, and a former President, and a distinguished medical professor.
The IPPR’s first meeting (17 September) began to formulate its key themes, methods of gathering evidence, and ways of undertaking its work. The Panel also undertook a mapping exercise of previous reviews into the functioning of the global health apparatus, and its response to previous pandemics and health emergencies. It intends to draw on previously gathered evidence where it can, and it will not be re-litigating the past or duplicating previous work.[4]
In her opening remarks, Ms Sirleaf emphasised that the IPPR would “pursue an evidence-based quest to protect human health”, because “the world could have done better,” while Helen Clark emphasised that the Panel is not engaging in “a blame game”, but is instead “truth seeking, distilling lessons learned, and making recommendations…”[5]
The Co-Chairs reiterated that their Panel would operate independently and impartially, no doubt seeking to reinforce IPPR’s credibility.
Now that the Panel’s work has begun, it will provide progress updates to the WHO’s governing bodies, including the Executive Committee, and will present its report to the World Health Assembly in March 2021. This relatively quick turnaround means the IPPR should hopefully avoid becoming mired in bureaucracy, and can produce a report while the impetus for improvement remains high.
The IPPR presents an opportunity for what will hopefully be meaningful critical analysis of WHO and the international community’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Provided that the WHO, and member states themselves, contribute freely to the review and do not seek to impinge on the Panel’s independence and mandate, the IPPR may well present the best opportunity for finding international lessons for the future.
Whether the recommendations the Panel produces are ultimately acknowledged and given credence is another question. But if nothing else, the WHO should utilise the IPPR’s review as a chance to rebuild or enhance its credibility – depending, perhaps, on one’s perspective.
It is doubtful whether the IPPR’s report will be enough, in itself, to bring the US back into the fold. That more likely depends on the outcome of November’s presidential election. But regardless, the report should hopefully contribute to the discourse on how the international community responds to pandemics and other health emergencies in the future.
As Ms Sirleaf remarked, “COVID-19 is not the first pandemic, [and] it will not be the last…no one wants to repeat the experiences of COVID-19.”
[1] https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html, as at 22 September 2020.
[2] https://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA73/A73_R1-en.pdf.
[3] https://www.dropbox.com/s/5hx5oprdg3c2aaq/TheIndependentPanel_TermsofReference.pdf?dl=0.
[4] https://www.dropbox.com/s/5hx5oprdg3c2aaq/TheIndependentPanel_TermsofReference.pdf?dl=0.
[5] https://www.dropbox.com/s/tpcx8yp8rbhbjzw/IndependentPanel_Co-ChairWelcomeRemarks.pdf?dl=0.
by Joanna Tao | Sep 24, 2020 | Board
Over the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a recognition of the reality that the virus and ensuing protective measures have had a profound impact on peace and security across the globe.
With worldwide lockdowns pushing youth out of schools and entry-level positions, skilled practitioners out of work, and small businesses out of pocket, not only are we projected to have 135 m. people facing starvation by the end of 2020, but we are dealing with an international legal system ill-equipped to provide urgent and united solutions.
The scope of any solution is also limited by ongoing regional conflicts and, without doubt, those impacted by regional conflicts will face compounded impacts of the pandemic.
On 1 July 2020, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted res. 2532 – the result of Secretary General Guterres’ appeal since March for a global ceasefire. Ultimately, this resolution is a significant indicator of the link between the pandemic and global security, and the relevance of this link in the UN’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Res. 2532 demands a ‘general and immediate cessation of hostilities in all situations on its agenda’. In unanimously adopting this long-stalled resolution, the UNSC recognised the critical role of peace and security in efforts to combat the pandemic.
– It calls for all state parties engaged in armed conflicts to ‘engage immediately in a durable humanitarian pause for at least 90 consecutive days’.
– It draws on the UNSC’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security while expressing grave concern about the unprecedented impact of COVID-19.
– It recognises that conditions of instability due to conflict can exacerbate the impacts of the pandemic and vice versa; and jeopardises an inclusive and coordinated response required for a long-term solution.
– And in recognising the afore-mentioned, the UNSC could not ignore the disproportionate negative socioeconomic impact on women, children, refugees, internally displaced persons and persons with disabilities.
So what does the substance of this resolution call for? While it expressly excludes military operations against Council-designated terrorist groups, the humanitarian pause on conflict aims to enable safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian assistance by impartial humanitarian actors in line with the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.
This ‘humanitarian pause’ is coupled with a request to the UNSG to ensure an acceleration in the UN’s COVID-19 response, with an emphasis on those states embroiled in conflict. Additionally, the SG is to provide updates on the response, and the impact of COVID-19 on mandated peacekeeping operations.
The resolution is hailed as a strong signal of unity within the Council and a sign of hope to the world. But this is by no means the first time a global ceasefire has been called in response to a humanitarian crisis. The preventative measure alone helps the Council to generate momentum and additional political, operational and financial commitment from the international community. However, without concrete economic sanctions, stalemates in further negotiations on WHO and some degree of binding authority, UNSC calls through res. 2532 will almost inescapably be undermined.
Without binding authority, and with states questioning what role (if any) the Security Council should play in a global health crisis, res. 2532 acknowledges that the Council has (and in my personal opinion should have) a role when a global pandemic affects the maintenance of peace and security.
The UNSC draws a unique strength from the ability to mobilise the global community around global problems, from the authority to issue binding decisions, and the authority it holds from acting on behalf of UN membership.
Relevant to the times, the additional humanitarian obligation in res. 2532 shows the Council as acting in parallel with the General Assembly, deemed the actor on broader topics which include humanitarian ones.
An example of this type of action in the past can be drawn from the Council’s involvement in urging states to implement temporary recommendations issued by the WHO during the Ebola outbreak, creating a legal commitment which would have otherwise rested on unstable grounds. Unfortunately though, owing to a growing mistrust in the WHO and an attempt to urgently pass the resolution, the Council in res. 2532 did not go as far, in terms of legal commitment, for the COVID-19 pandemic as it did for the Ebola outbreak.
Given the multilateral stalemate that pre-dates the COVID-19 pandemic, the difficulty in coordinated response and the late passage of res. 2532, we can expect some limited benefits of a long awaited agreement which attempts to place humanitarian needs at the forefront in a global pandemic that affects peace and security.
More work on this has been, and is still to be, done. Nonetheless, res. 2532 gave mediators in conflict areas an important impetus to halt offensive operations. The 90-day pause set an achievable temporary goal which is easier to achieve than past aspirational goals that have failed to permanently stop these types of crises.
The resolution also creates a monitoring framework, through the SG’s updates on cease-fire operations, for documenting any violators of the resolution. International scrutiny and political pressure have proven to be a major deterrent to and resumption of violence. And finally, the resolution opens access for humanitarian assistance in conflict areas that need it the most.
Like most international solutions, the success of res. 2532 depends on the grit of diplomats and what extent member states are willing to go to, in order to make global ceasefires a reality. While not impossible, it will require significant coordination between international, regional and local mediators.
Notwithstanding its delay and seemingly limited reach, res. 2532 is a step in the right direction for multilateral negotiations. Any step to improve access amid escalating and compounding humanitarian crises merits full support from the international community.
by Ramesh Thakur | Sep 11, 2020 | Board
As the UN General Assembly opens its annual session for 2020/21 this month, delegates should introspect on the transformations in world affairs in the 75 years since the Charter was signed.
In 1945, Britain and France were ‘victorious’ Allied powers but in economic ruins; the Soviet Union was ruled by Stalin and had suffered massive loss of human life in the war; China was wracked by civil war between Mao Zedong’s communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists; and the United States bestrode the world like a colossus.
Elsewhere, Germany and Japan were defeated enemy powers; India was still a British colony; and South Africa was an apartheid state but not yet an international pariah. Today the last four are major claimants to permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).
The world has changed in other major respects too.
- Military power is no longer easily converted into currencies of power and influence.
- Threat perceptions have broadened from hard to human security issues like climate change and pandemics.
- Democracy has been de-consolidated with dwindling trust and faith in democratic institutions and governments, even in Western societies.
Based more on performance than values and process, wealth, power and legitimacy of existing national political institutions have drifted eastward. Of most relevance to the UN, the emerging international order is not unipolar, bipolar or even multipolar, but polycentric, with a resulting ‘pluralization of diplomacy’ where countries do not coalesce around rigid blocs.
With such big structural transformations, there is zero reason for expectations of continued effectiveness of mandated multilateral machinery that reflected the particular distribution of power, the security threats, and other structural-contextual factors of 1945.
Moreover, in today’s world, no country has the leverage to set the rules largely on its own and as an externalization of its organizing political principles as the US was able to do in 1945.
If the UNSC is to be made fit-for-purpose far beyond 2020, the first and most urgent task is to add more permanent members. The key actors making and enforcing coercive decisions in the name and on behalf of the international community have to be the major powers of the day.
On this criterion, the UNSC fails the test comprehensively. Whether newer members of an enlarged UNSC should be ‘permanent’ will be contentious. Introducing a third category of ten-year veto-less members eligible for re-election will add to the complexity while also leaving the new members dissatisfied. That means the choice should be either to downsize the existing P5 also to ten-year renewable terms with no veto power, or else to enlarge the P5 to P10 with the same veto rights as the existing five.
Second, the elected membership of the UNSC should also be reformed with respect to numbers (increased from 10 to 18), terms (expanded from two to three years) and roles. Their potential utility in revitalizing the Council as an effective executive body has been unfairly relegated. Increasing the size of the UNSC and extending the term of the elected members would increase its capacity to fulfil its responsibilities for maintaining international peace and security. Those who contribute the most to the UN’s regular budget, specialized agencies, and peace operations should have a commensurate say in making decisions; those who make the decisions should contribute commensurately.
Third, there should be a more equal division of responsibility between the UNSC and the General Assembly. The Council has vastly expanded its powers and reach in recent years, including with respect to the use of military force, coercive economic sanctions, and directing member states on the terms of domestic legislation. The growth of the Council’s reach has been accompanied by a curtailment of the Assembly’s power, prestige and authority. A reset is required to restore the balance between the normative power of the Assembly deriving from universal membership and the geopolitical clout of the UNSC based on military weight.
Opponents of UNSC reform are in denial about the critical importance and urgency of the subject. It is central to other much needed reforms, including management and personnel, not peripheral to or a distraction from them. The brutal reality is that resistance to UNSC reform has held up progress on much of the rest of the U.N. reform agenda. Obsession with the latter without confronting the UNSC deadlock is akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic as it sank.
Nothing in the history of UN reform efforts gives cause for optimism and gathering rosebuds of consolation of a trickle of management reform achievements will not rescue multilateralism nor save the organization. It seems to have become reform-proof. Yet without major reform of the UNSC, the United Nations will continue its slide into diminished credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness, and reduced capacity to act in defence of the common peace.
The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) have long had a compelling case for permanent membership based on the UN’s foundational values, objective material criteria and the logic of collective action. Despite broad support, their efforts have been stymied by the obstreperous actions of a few determined rivals and opponents. In the process one additional criterion of permanent membership has become apparent and which none of the four seems to possess: the ability to conduct hardball diplomacy.
The last big push for major reform petered out in 2005. The G4 are even further away from their goal now.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that all four since then had refused to contest for UNSC elections, to pay a single dollar in voluntary contributions, to accept the writ of an illegitimate UNSC even under compulsory Chapter VII resolutions, and to contribute personnel and money to U.N. peace operations. Might this have concentrated the minds of the rest of the UN members to the gravity of the crisis and brought them any nearer to permanent membership?
Or, would it have alienated them from the UN community?
Alternatively, with reasoned arguments falling on deaf years for decades, do the candidate countries have any other realistic leverage to advance their case to fruition?
I guess they could continue to demonstrate the validity of Einstein’s definition of insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result each time.
by David Minton | Sep 9, 2020 | Guests
In Part I, I commented on the state of individual fitness at the national level, focusing on the UK and the USA. In short, levels of physical activity need to increase.
But what about at the global level – through genuine global cooperation, across all countries? And who should be responsible?
The current international organizational system
The UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (2015) currently form the central focus of the global community’s primary aspirations for a better quality of human (and other) life. SDG 3 concerns ‘Good Health and Wellbeing’. Its nine targets understandably focus on broad components: child health, maternal health, disease prevention. It’s left to the World Health Organization to explore natural ways of attaining good health and wellbeing, beyond medical and technological means.
For its part of course, WHO is currently at the centre of global attention, and has experienced more than its fair share of criticism, particularly for its early handling of the outbreak in and outside China.
There is no point commenting here on the US reflexive spasm towards the WHO under its current Administration; other than noting that the EU and UK took an entirely different approach – fix it; don’t spurn it. The independent review team of Helen Clark and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has already indicated that they will be looking for improvement, not retribution. But, what of the WHO right now, regarding ‘fitness’?
World Health Organization
In fact, the WHO has a reasonably extensive exploration of the question of individual fitness. It offers six key facts as its departing point:
- Insufficient physical activity is one of the leading risk factors for death worldwide.
- Insufficient physical activity is a key risk factor for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) such as cardiovascular diseases, cancer and diabetes.
- Physical activity has significant health benefits and contributes to prevent NCDs.
- Globally, 1 in 4 adults is not active enough.
- More than 80% of the world’s adolescent population is insufficiently physically active.
- Policies to address insufficient physical activity are operational in 56% of WHO Member States.
- WHO Member States have agreed to reduce insufficient physical activity by 10% by 2025.
What is physical activity?
WHO defines physical activity as:
”any bodily movement produced by skeletal muscles that requires energy expenditure, including activities undertaken while working, playing, carrying out household chores, travelling, and engaging in recreational pursuits.”
Exercise’ is a sub-category of physical activity that is:
“ planned, structured, repetitive, and aims to improve or maintain one or more components of physical fitness. Beyond exercise, any other physical activity that is done during leisure time, for transport to get to and from places, or as part of a person’s work, has a health benefit.”[1]
It is intriguing that the WHO does not precisely define ‘fitness’ as such; the nearest it approaches is an observation that: “Fitness assessments involve aerobic capacity, flexibility, muscular endurance, and muscular strength and body composition.”[2]
Perhaps the most rigorous definition of ‘fitness, with a three-fold component (physiological, health-related, skill-related) was advanced in 2000 by the US President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports.[3]
Regular physical activity helps prevent obesity, heart disease, hypertension, diabetes and premature mortality.
These lifestyle diseases are an economic burden on all health services and a major public health burden worldwide. Fifteen years ago the WHO estimated that 61% of all deaths (35 m. people) were attributable to these chronic diseases. It is estimated that if the British people were 5% fitter, with an equivalent weight loss, this could save the NHS £5 b. annually.
All well and good; it is thus ‘exercise’ I am addressing when I speak of ‘fitness’, at least in the sense of the process (activity) designed to achieve individual fitness, and the above assessment of the components will suffice. And, my own interest is in achieving fitness through leisure exercise.
WHO promotion of physical activity
WHO conveys, methodically, what is clearly apparent to us intuitively: namely, that levels of physical activity around the word are inadequate:
- Globally, 23% of adults were not active enough in 2020 (20% men; 27% women);
- In high-income countries, the stats are worse (26% men; 35% women);
- In low-income countries, the stats are better (12% men; 24% women).
Global Action Plan for Physical Activity
What to do? WHO identifies a set of (nine) NCD targets, with the aim of reducing ‘premature deaths’ around the world by 25% by 2025.[4] Goal 3 is a 10% relative reduction in the prevalence of insufficient physical activity by 2025.[5] As the WHO puts it: “achieving these targets is feasible through high-level political commitment, whole-of-government action, and support and engagement from everyone to create the healthy environments needed to beat NCDs.”
Again, well and good. But, as we know only too well with the coronavirus, the WHO is empowered only to set guidelines and encourage national action on the targets. It runs a ‘campaign’ to that effect.[6] But, it seems palpably obvious that we need something more.
A ‘Global Exercise Council’
I propose a new Global Exercise Council, GEC, to encourage governments to improve the health of their nations.
Such a body could produce the exercise equivalent of GDP per capita. Each country would have an ‘E-rating’ (as opposed to the Covid R rating) where E equals the overall exercise and an indicator of the health of a nation.
The GEC could operate as an integral part of WHO. Or it could act independently. There would be competing reasons for either one.
Either way. there is no time to waste. The new body needs to prepare for future pandemics, not to mention natural disasters and the annual flu virus. Governments concentrate on the sickness of health and the existing international bodies have proved largely inadequate in encouraging activity. The GEC would have more powers of persuasion than is currently the case with international organizations.
[1] https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/physical-activity
[2] Guidelines on Improving the Physical Fitness of Employees (WHO European Centre for Environment and Health; 1999), p. 38 https://www.who.int/occupational_health/publications/eurfitness/en/
[3] Definitions: Health, Fitness and Physical Activity: http://www.fitness.gov/digest_mar2000.htm
[4] Non-Communicable Disease Targets: https://www.who.int/beat-ncds/take-action/targets/en/
[5] Goal 3: Reduce Physical inactivity: https://www.who.int/beat-ncds/take-action/policy-brief-reduce-physical-inactivity.pdf?ua=1
[6] https://www.who.int/beat-ncds/countries/en/
by David Minton | Sep 7, 2020 | Guests
The current Covid pandemic has swiped the human species like few events before. In early September, we have 25 m. cases and are heading for 1 m. fatalities. It is an historic challenge to the international community of states. And it is an existential threat to the global community of peoples.
Overwhelmingly, our attention is focused on containment and eradication, through collective response – through both political action (lockdown; tracing) and medical (vaccine development).
For its part, herd immunity is rightly critiqued, over the short-term for triage of the elderly, and over the long-term for the unlikelihood of getting to the required threshold (50% to 83% of the population).
But, what might be the collective outcome of our total individual responses to Covid through a different medium? What might be the implications of individual fitness for the pandemic – which is a global phenomenon? This is the area I happen to work in, and have experience across a wide variety of countries.
In this first part of my column, then, I address what is occurring in a few specific countries. In Part II, I explore what might be a genuine ‘global fitness response’.
‘Survival of the fittest’
… is a phrase first used by Herbert Spencer, after reading Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, Principles of Biology (1859). It was too late for Darwin to use the phrase in the 4th edition which was already being printed, but it appeared in the 5th in 1869. By ‘fittest’, Darwin meant ‘better adapted for the immediate local environment’, not the more common meaning of ‘in the best physical shape’.
Yet, 156 years on, I suggest the word ‘fittest’, in this common catchphrase, needs to be linked to the health of the individual, the nation and global community. For definitions in the standard terminology, I shall leave to Part II.
Historically, sedentary behaviour is not new. In the 6th c. BCE, Pythagoras was advocating daily exercise for health reasons. Two centuries later, Hippocrates opined that ‘walking is the best medicine’. In our current time, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges has reported that ‘exercise really is a miracle cure’, while Prof Chris Whitty (Chief Medical Officer for England) has noted that health advice, such as exercising more, has not changed since the Greek philosophers conveyed this, over two millennia ago.
United Kingdom
In the UK we have public health protection powers. Besides the expected measure of removal of causes of ill health, this also includes education to promote health and encouragement of individual responsibility for health.
There has been further regulation, notably The Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act 1984, giving powers to control disease. The emphasis, as in most countries, is on control rather than prevention. If selection of diseases for eradication is based on rigorous criteria, should we not be developing accurate diagnostic tools to improve the ‘fitness’ of individuals, particularly given the lessons from the current pandemic?
The Nutrition Society, based in London and advancing nutritional science since 1941, is now one of the largest learned societies for nutrition in the world. During lockdown, one of its journals published data showing how your Body Mass Index (BMI) goes up (as does your chance of going onto a ventilator) if you are admitted to hospital with Covid-19.
This data has been used by health authorities around the world to highlight the immediate dangers of being overweight. The World Obesity Federation (WOF) states that two-thirds of those falling seriously ill with coronavirus were overweight or obese. The PM, Boris Johnson, knows only too well, having been admitted to hospital with the virus whilst overweight himself. The WHO’s information on ‘prevalence of obesity’ shows the UK, as with all countries in Europe, to be both overweight and obese.
The aftermath of World War II was the beginning of a new era. The shared suffering and sacrifice of the war years pushed governments into developing basic care for their citizens as a right – and obligation. The new British Labour Government at the time moved rapidly to establish the welfare state. The National Health Service (NHS) has been funded out of general taxation since 1948.
Thursday evenings during lockdown at 20.00 BST, the nation applauded the NHS frontline staff, key workers plus the many new heroes helping meet the challenge from the global pandemic. The ‘Stay Home; Protect the NHS; Save Lives’ campaign was the backbone of the lockdown restrictions. The applause has stopped, but this impromptu movement could morph into ‘Stay fit; Protect the NHS’. The aftermath of the first global pandemic in our lifetime needs a substantial new response if individuals and governments are to improve levels of health.
For the first time since the 1940s, exercise became one of the few defined reasons that people in the UK could leave their home during the coronavirus pandemic. The PM encouraged people to take ‘one form of exercise a day’, understanding how important it is for people’s mental and physical health during lockdown. Improved individual fitness levels in turn will alleviate pressure on the NHS from the so-called lifestyle diseases.
So, now that we have got through lockdown – just, thanks to the Chancellor’s job retention scheme – we need to build on the Government’s lockdown message of daily exercise. Post-lockdown, the Chancellor has spent around £600m in August encouraging us to ‘Eat Out to Help Out’ the hospitality sector.
Now we need a campaign for exercise. One of the Government’s priorities should be to encourage the population to continue with daily exercise.
In the past 50 years little has been done to improve the ‘fitness’ of the nation. Two Prime Ministers, Major and Blair, encouraged sport more than any others. In 2012 the UK hosted the Summer Olympic Games and can be proud of the physical legacy but these events do little to encourage ongoing participation in sport or improving the health of the host nation. The British Olympic Association and UK Sport methodically work out the business plan for medals very successfully. In 2012 the British team won 65 medals and then, four years later in Rio, secured a record haul of 67. The 2016 Olympics was the most successful overseas tournament in Team GB’s history, with 27 golds, 23 silvers and 17 bronzes. The ‘price-per-medal’ was £4,096,500. There was no parallel budget or planning to increase mass participation, daily exercise or fitness levels.
Our Prime Minister has been ‘working out’ in the grounds of Buckingham Palace, playing tennis at the American Ambassador’s residence and jogging around Lambeth Palace, home of Archbishop of Canterbury. In the process he has discovered that the sacred and profane of exercise fails to achieve desired results. A celebrity personal trainer (PT) has now been employed.
Perhaps a way of ‘levelling up’ the health inequalities across the country is to offer a PT to everyone. Singer songwriter Adele, with fifteen Grammy Awards, transformed her fitness level and weight with a PT – one of many celebrity ambassadors improving the level of fitness by leadership and design. What if the Prime Minister of the UK took on a similar public ambassador role for personal fitness? The third largest public health campaign, after car seat belts and anti-smoking, could be improving personal fitness levels for the entire population. Backed by personal trainers on the NHS, helping everyone get in the best physical shape, so healthy individuals contribute to the health of the nation and the wider global community.
The Government has an aim of ‘levelling up’ the nation which needs to include closing the health gap. Post Covid-19 the Government is already reshaping the public health strategy by abolishing Public Health England and creating a new body charged with preventing future outbreaks.
If the Government has a moral duty to improve the health of the nation, should we not take the chance to reshape the myriad of organizations responsible for sport, recreation and fitness and move the focus onto daily movement, exercise and health improvement?
United States
As we all know, the US has the highest number of cases and deaths in the world. But some leaders are getting the message.
In the US, Michelle Obama’s ‘Let’s Move’ public health campaign was part of the effort to tackle their public health crisis. The US Centre for Disease Control publishes obesity rates, broken down by age-group. Its report found that, between 2009 and 2012, rates dropped for those 2-5 and 6-11 years old. The campaign enlisted a wide range of support including, in 2011, the superstar Beyonce’s ‘Flash Workout’.
For her part, Oprah Winfrey, North America’s first black multi-billionaire and the richest African American of the 20th century, decided to do something about her weight after being told she was at risk of developing diabetes.
Survival of the fittest — revisited
We should not underestimate the profound change that simple shifts in habits and attitude can have. Whoever would have thought that the simple bar of soap would take on a starring role in preventing the spread of Covid-19?
Exercise for the masses could be the legacy of this global pandemic. Activity can be done without any expense or equipment; lockdown proved this. Promotion can also be done without any major expense thanks to influencers, social media and philanthropic organizations. This pandemic is proving to be the mother of exercise invention.
Yet little is known about ‘exercise’. We are scratching the surface in terms of knowledge, research and data compared to public health. One organization is worthy of note. The Bloomberg School of Public Health (Johns Hopkins University; Baltimore) has frequently been quoted by the global media during the pandemic, It is the largest public health school in the world, with over 1,800 courses, eighty plus research centres and institutes, and over 800 full-time and 400 part-time academics. This one institution has more budget, staff and students than all sports and exercise science departments in the UK combined.
The world
So much for the ‘advanced nations’; governments, like individuals, need guidance, leadership, science and knowledge. What, then, of the world – the global response to the global pandemic, that might reflect the above thoughts on ‘fitness’? Let me explore this in Part II.
